The Fatal Leviathan: A Hayekian Perspective of Lex Mercatoria in Civil Law Countries by Núñez del Prado Ch., Fabio
Pace International Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 2 Spring 2019 Article 3 
March 2019 
The Fatal Leviathan: A Hayekian Perspective of Lex Mercatoria in 
Civil Law Countries 
Fabio Núñez del Prado Ch. 
Yale Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fabio Núñez del Prado Ch., The Fatal Leviathan: A Hayekian Perspective of Lex Mercatoria in 
Civil Law Countries, 31 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 423 (2019) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
 
423 
THE FATAL LEVIATHAN: A HAYEKIAN 
PERSPECTIVE OF LEX MERCATORIA IN 
CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 





Who should create default commercial rules? Should they be 
created in a constructivist way or should they be created rather 
through a spontaneous order? Should Kelsen’s positivism prevail in 
commercial law? Drawing on diverse libertarian literature, I will 
argue that, since courts do not play a dominant role in civil law 
countries and, more importantly, do not set precedents, default 
commercial rules should not be created by the legislator, but 
through the Lex Mercatoria. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is the common law system better than the civil law system or 
vice versa?  With respect to commercial law, while clearly both legal 
systems have advantages and disadvantages, the common law is much 
more efficient.  In my view, this is partially explained by the fact that 
judges are better commercial rule creators than legislators or other 
lawmakers.1 
As Professor Schwartz has suggested, there are two reasons 
why common law courts enjoy a comparative advantage in rule 
creation.  First, these courts apply common law rules in several 
economic sectors.2  Second, the courts cannot continue to apply a 
default commercial rule that merchants would reject because 
otherwise they would fill the gap with their own rule.  Hence, a 
judicially created default commercial rule can only become part of 
the common law of contracts only if parties accept it.3 
Much has been written in the common law about default 
rules.4  Various legal academics in the common law tradition have 
answered every imaginable question related to this topic, including: 
(1) when should a rule be default; (2) what types of default rules 
should exist; and (3) who should create default rules?5 By contrast, 
                                                            
1 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract 
and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2016) (affirming the 
notion that “the common law is a better institution than the private law-making 
bodies for creating contract law defaults that contracting parties will accept.”). 
2 Id. at 1530. 
3 Id. at 1530–31.  
4 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (Faculty 
Scholarship Series); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); 
Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, COLUM. L. REV. 
400, 400–01 (2009); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance 
Law and Its Proper Domain, VAND. L. REV. 829, 835–36 (1985). 
5 Professors Schwartz and Scott have explained how are default 
commercial rules created in the common law. In this sense, Schwartz and Scott 
have synthesized and affirmed in the abstract of their article that “[t]he common 
law developed over centuries a small set of default rules that courts have used to 
fill gaps in otherwise incomplete contracts between commercial parties. These 
rules can be applied almost independently of context . . . When parties in various 
sectors of the economy write sales contracts but leave terms blank, courts fill in 
the blanks with their own rules. As a consequence, a judicial rule that many parties 
accept must be “transcontextual”: parties in varied commercial contexts accept 
3
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in civil law countries, the legal writing on default rules are 
conspicuous in their absence; virtually nothing has been written.6  
Latin American universities teach that default rules must exist 
because they reduce transaction costs, but nothing else.  It is not 
clear when, how or who should create these rules. 
Despite the above considerations, civil law countries have 
legislated an immense number of default rules on commercial law 
(“default commercial rules”).  Review of the Civil Codes and 
sectoral laws of these countries indicates that legislators have 
created thousands of default commercial rules through which they 
have allocated risks arbitrarily without the information necessary to 
do so.7 
 This paper will answer the following question: Who should 
create the majority of default commercial rules in civil law 
countries?8  Some scholars believe that filling the gaps is one of the 
most important duties of legislators.9  I will question that belief. 
Drawing on diverse libertarian literature, I will argue that 
default commercial rules should not be created by the legislator, but 
through the Lex Mercatoria, because courts do not play a dominant 
role in civil law countries and, more importantly, do not set 
precedents. 
The Article proceeds as follows: In the first section I will 
explain why legislators should not be responsible for creating 
default commercial rules.  Then, I will explain how social orders are 
created.  The third section will explain the origin of the Lex 
Mercatoria and the praxeological process by which default 
commercial rules are created.  I will then illustrate how default 
commercial rules are created in the construction sector.  Afterwards, 
                                                            
the courts’ rule by writing contracts that contain just the gap the rule could fill.” 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1523. 
6 Upon knowledge, the only important article that is available about 
default rules in Latin American universities is: Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Cubriendo Vacíos en Contratos Incompletos: Una Teoría Económica sobre 
Reglas Supletorias [Covering Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory about Supplementary Rules] 43 THĒMIS L.J. 195 (2003). 
7 See infra Section XI. 
8 In answering this question, this article will not seek to demonstrate who 
should create penalty or sticky default commercial rules. 
9 See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1525. 
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I will share some examples of default commercial rules of the 
Peruvian Civil Code that contravene the Lex Mercatoria. 
The seventh section will propose some parameters for 
determining when a default rule should be created by the State and 
when through the Lex Mercatoria.  I will then explain why arbitral 
awards are the source par excellence of Lex Mercatoria in the 
Peruvian legal system. In the penultimate section I conclude and 
finally I briefly explain my proposals. 
II. WHY SHOULDN’T DEFAULT COMMERCIAL RULES BE CREATED 
BY LEGISLATURES 
Commercial law is the body of law that regulates the conduct 
of merchants engaged in commerce and trade.  By contrast, civil law 
is the branch of law that regulates the legal relationships between 
privates. For the purposes of this paper, I will differentiate default civil 
rules and default commercial rules while acknowledging that it is 
difficult to draw a sharp boundary between them.10 
One example of a default civil rule is the fact that a promisor 
is only liable for damages foreseen or which could have reasonably 
been foreseen (by both parties) at the time when the agreement was 
made.  Such a civil default rule applies to any kind of contract. This 
rule can be applied almost independently of context.11 
By contrast, in the framework of a construction contract, it is 
a default commercial rule that the contractor must, whenever required 
                                                            
10 In fact, our concept of default civil rules is very similar to the concept 
of transcontextual default rules used by Professors Schwartz and Scott. In this 
regard, they have argued that “[t]he Anglo-American nineteenth-century contract 
law contained relatively few default rules and these rules had a particular 
character: they could be applied almost everywhere. Thus, the rule that an 
acceptance had to mirror the offer could be applied just by comparing the offer 
and the acceptance, whatever the content of those communications . . . [b]ecause 
the law was a set of defaults, a rule could exist through time only if later parties 
in different contexts than the one that constituted the originating case accepted it. 
Therefore, enduring common law rules have to be transcontextual; that is, they 
must be satisfactory to parties over broad sections of the economy. The common 
law of contract has few default rules because few rules can satisfy the structural 
requirement that they are (almost) everywhere applicable just because commercial 
parties (almost) everywhere like them. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1585–
86. 
11 Id. at 1523. 
5
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by the engineer, submit details of the arrangements and methods 
which the contractor proposes to adopt for the execution of the works.  
This default commercial rule applies only to construction contracts. 
Since commercial law applies to the professional activity of 
merchants, default commercial rules inevitably allocate risks.  In short, 
while default civil rules create civil law general institutions, default 
commercial rules tend to allocate risks in contracts of various 
economic sectors.12 
In the Civil Codes existing in countries with a civil law 
tradition, it is possible to find a large number of default commercial 
rules. In fact, after a general section on contract law that includes 
provisions on contract formation, interpretation, remedies, force 
majeure, hardship, fraud, duress and more, Civil Codes tend to include 
specific sections for sale contracts, lease contracts, supply contracts, 
and construction contracts, among others.13 These sections include 
                                                            
12 Professors Schwartz and Scott have differentiated contextual default 
rules from transcontextual default rules. However, this differentiation is basically 
the same that we do. Transcontextual default rules are usually civil default rules; 
while contextual default rules are usually default commercial rules. In this regard, 
Professors Schwartz and Scott have stated that “[t]he second distinction we make 
is between ‘contextual’ rules and standards and ‘transcontextual’ rules and 
standards. In this Article, a ‘context’ is an economic environment populated by 
agents with the same or similar contracting preferences. A context may be as small 
as the parties to a particular contract, but commonly is larger. For example, parties 
that trade wheat use contracts with the same or similar delivery terms and storage 
requirements. Hence, the wheat trade is a ‘context . . . [T]he term requiring notice 
of defects within a specified time is contextual because parties in different 
industries likely would choose different periods within which to make claims. An 
efficient notice term turns on how easy a defect is to discover, the nature of the 
goods, the seller’s ability to repair or replace, and similar factors. Thus, because 
wheat is perishable while machines are not, the contract term requiring notice of 
a defect commonly differs between the wheat context and machine contexts.”  Id. 
at 1527. 
13 It is enough to review the Civil Codes of Latin American countries or the 
UNIDROIT Principles to notice that this is the way in which these normative texts 
are usually structured.  Schwartz and Scott explain that in the common law there 
are a few numbers of transcontextual rules such as “the rules of offer and 
acceptance, conditions, impossibility, expectation damages, foreseeability, and 
indefiniteness . . . Such doctrines include fraudulent and innocent 
misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, unilateral and mutual mistake, and 
specific performance and other injunctive relief, as well as equitable principles 
specifically designed to vitiate clear common law rules, including the penalty 
doctrine, the forfeiture doctrine, and the doctrines specifically inviting the court 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/3
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hundreds of default commercial rules by which technical risks are 
allocated to one party or the other. 
If the legislators of Civil Codes were asked how they designed 
the default commercial rules, they would most likely answer that they 
simulated what the parties of such contracts would have wanted. In 
other words, the literature guides the drafters in this task primarily with 
the admonition to create rules that “the majority” of future parties 
would prefer.  
The problem with these assertions is that they are grounded on 
a false premise. They are based on the idea that legislators are in a 
privileged position to create default commercial rules. However, why 
should it be assumed that legislators have sufficient information to 
determine what the majority wants? In fact, legislators are frequently 
unaware of merchants’ needs. It is worth recalling that the creation of 
these default rules usually requires highly specialized, technical 
knowledge. In effect, legislators should not be entitled to create default 
rules that the majority of merchants would prefer unless they were 
default civil rules.14 
Nowadays there is such a diversity of contracts that if 
legislators want to legislate in order to respond to the merchants’ needs 
in every single economic sector, they would have to create a Civil 
Code with thousands, perhaps millions of rules. In this regard, 
Schwartz and Scott have affirmed that: 
 
Because most contract terms are contextual, it follows that default rules 
that substitute for those terms must be contextual as well. As a 
consequence, the Restatement and UCC drafters would have had to create 
a large number of contextual rules for many contracting problems. For 
example, had the UCC attempted to regulate notice-of-breach issues with 
rules, the drafters would have been required to create a menu of rules 
governing notice, each of which would have solved the problem of 
choosing an efficient notice period for a particular context or for similar 
contexts. It may be apparent, and it is our claim, that drafters could not 
then and cannot now create efficient defaults such as these. The UCC and 
the Restatement apply to the entire U.S. economy. There are so many 
contexts in this economy that the drafters could not access the necessary 
context information (what is maximizing for parties that transacted in 
                                                            
to rely on the factual context of the particular dispute in derogation of the common 
law rules of interpretation.”  Id. 1540–41. 
14 Id. at 1554. 
7
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context X may not have been maximizing for parties that transacted in 
context Y); nor could the drafters, even if well informed, create the very 
large number of rules that parties functioning in these contexts would 
require.15 
 
In civil law countries, default commercial rules proliferate 
rapidly in an almost uncontrolled fashion. Legislators, who lack the 
necessary technical background, are charged with allocating risks 
through default commercial rules.  These rules lack technical 
rationality.  Cases abound in economic sectors such as construction, 
energy, mining, finance, and many others.16 Even in sale and lease 
contracts, the risk allocations made by the legislator are unsustainable 
in commercial practice. 17 
Legislators should not have the responsibility of creating 
default commercial rules.  They lack enough information to adopt such 
decisions; therefore, they do not have the legitimacy to fulfill such an 
important task.  Even in the common law, the drafters implicitly 
recognized the difficulty of creating efficient default rules, and 
proposed few rules for the Second Restatement of Contracts and the 
UCC.18 
Conferring the power to make default commercial rules upon 
the legislator is an absurdity.  For example, it is taken for granted 
that lawmakers are in a privileged position to allocate risks in an 
energy contract, to determine who should be liable under certain 
breaches in a long-term construction contract, to decide who should 
assume a risk under a contingency not foreseen in a share purchase 
agreement, and to distribute risks in a thousand other extremely 
technical scenarios.  In my view, the legislator is frequently in a very 
poor position to adopt such decisions. 
Legislators are not intelligent enough to decide how risks 
should be allocated in contracts of different economic sectors.  It is 
simply humanly impossible for a single individual (or even group of 
individuals) to store the information that is derived from the millions 
of transactions that are executed every day. 
As explained by Schwartz and Scott: “[t]he inability of 
                                                            
15 Id. at 1528 (emphasis in original). 
16 See infra Section XI. 
17 Id. 
18 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1526. 
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drafters to create contextual defaults explains both phenomena . . . 
The drafters have no fact-finding arm; they cannot hold hearings or 
call expert witnesses. Nor do drafters have the resources to retain 
experts or commission studies.”19 
 As Hayek points out in The Use of Knowledge in Society, 
knowledge is dispersed among thousands of individuals who cast 
votes every time they enter into a contract with particular clauses.  
By means of these votes, they reveal how risks should be allocated 
in a specific economic sector.20 
 In Hayek's words: 
 
Concerning our modern economic system, understanding of the principles 
by which its order forms itself shows us that it rests on the use of 
knowledge (and of skills in obtaining relevant information) which no one 
possesses in its entirety, and that it is brought about because individuals 
are in their actions guided by certain general rules. Certainly, we ought not 
to succumb to the false belief, or delusion, that we can replace it with a 
different kind of order which presupposes that all this knowledge can be 
concentrated in a central brain, or group of brains of any practicable size.21 
 
 Hence, those who have the information and legitimacy to 
allocate risks efficiently in contracts are trade operators whose 
commercial practices are in widespread use.  They know better than 
anyone their own interests and expectations. As we will see in a later 
section, these generalized practices of merchants constitute Lex 
Mercatoria. 
 While legislators typically do not have sufficient 
information to choose the rule that is preferred by merchants, one 
can imagine a hypothetical situation in which the legislator guessed 
the correct default commercial rule.  In this case, the rules chosen 
will likely soon become outdated, since the needs of merchants vary 
much faster than it is possible to imagine.  The cost of amending 
statutes makes matters even worse.  When it comes to the 
distribution of risks of all economic sectors, while commerce 
progresses at full speed, State imposed rules remain stagnant for 
                                                            
19 Id. at 1569. 
20 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 520 (1945) [hereinafter The Use of Knowledge in Society]. 
21 F. A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS 
AND HISTORY OF IDEAS 13 (1978) [hereinafter NEW STUDIES]. 
9
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years. 
 For example, the share purchase agreement that two parties 
can engage in today is not the same as the one that was available 10 
years ago. Model contracts and the Lex Mercatoria continually 
change to adapt to the new needs and expectations of merchants, and 
the law must be sufficiently flexible to adapt and provide immediate 
and effective responses to these new demands. 
 The UNIDROIT Principles are the best example of the 
changing character of commercial law:  They were drafted in 1994, 
modified in 2004 and 2010, and have again recently been modified 
in 2016.  They have continually evolved to respond effectively to 
the changing needs and expectations of trade operators. 
 For instance, the Governing Council of UNIDROIT realized 
a few years ago that the UNIDROIT Principles of 2010 did not 
provide an effective response to long-term contracts, so they reacted 
immediately and began working on a new edition that was approved 
a few years later.  Along these lines, the introduction of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of 2016 expressly states the following: 
 
The 2016 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles is not intended as a revision 
of the previous editions. As amply demonstrated by the extensive body of 
case law and bibliographic references on the UNILEX database . . . the 
UNIDROIT Principles continue to be well received generally and have not 
given rise in practice to any significant difficulties of application. The 
main objective of the fourth edition of the UNIDROIT Principles is to take 
better into account the special needs of long-term contracts.22 
 
 Despite being a text that includes general rules and 
principles, it remains in constant evolution.  If this happens with the 
UNIDROIT Principles, the sectoral rules by which risks are 
allocated must be flexible and adapt without any major obstacles to 
the new demands of commerce.  Since by their very nature they are 
dynamic, these rules cannot be permanent. 
 Thus, if the needs of the merchants change, the rules that 
respond to these needs must also change.  However, when these 
needs are regulated by State-rules, the possibility of amending the 
rules to commercial practice is extremely costly. 
                                                            
22 Overview, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/unidroit-principles-
2016/unidroit-principles-2016-over (last visited June 27, 2019) (emphasis added). 
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 Amending a Civil Code is a very complicated task, involving 
a heavy dose of political negotiation.  There have been several 
attempts to modify the Peruvian Civil Code, all of them frustrated.  
This has a very simple explanation:  The attempts to change 
legislation constitute authentic litigation in which there are many 
political interests, so it is very difficult to reach a consensus.  The 
rule may be totally outdated and still remain in force because there 
are political interests involved.  In the words of Professor Neely: 
“Efforts to change existing laws can be characterized as ‘disputes,’ 
but they are political disputes rather than the factual disputes that 
courts are theoretically in business to resolve.”23 
 The best example of this problem is the Peruvian Civil Code.  
It is obvious that we no longer live in 1984, the date in which the 
Peruvian Civil Code was enacted.  Obviously, the rules designed in 
1984 do not respond effectively to the myriad of situations that may 
arise today.  The reality is quite different today. 
 Thus, this Civil Code includes plenty of default commercial 
rules for accommodation contracts, custodian contracts, bailment 
contracts, and others.  These contracts are rarely executed today, as 
such, the default rules of the Civil Code that regulate this contract 
are factually derogated.  However, since the Peruvian Civil Code 
hasn’t been amended for more than 35 years, these provisions 
remain, despite the societal changes that have occurred. 
 By contrast, the contracts that are executed more frequently 
today, such as energy contracts, leasing contracts, financing 
contracts, and more, are not contemplated in the Peruvian Civil 
Code.  Nevertheless, judges and arbitrators have never had problems 
in resolving disputes that arise from such contracts.  They apply the 
Lex Mercatoria for any situation that has not been foreseen by the 
parties. 
 The most serious situations, however, occur with the 
provisions for sale contracts and construction contracts that are 
regulated in the Peruvian Civil Code.  As mentioned previously, 
these provisions were enacted in 1984, so obviously, with the 
changes over the past 35 years, the provisions do not satisfy the 
current needs and expectations of merchants.  The problem is, 
although these rules are divorced from our current commercial 
                                                            
23 RICHARD NEELY, WHY COURTS DON’T WORK 167 (1983). 
11
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reality, judges and arbitrators must apply them to any controversy. 
 Given the drastically changing commercial reality, it is 
indeed arbitrary to apply these rules.  It is well-known that the 
construction sector is very dynamic, so the needs of merchants in 
this economic sector change all the time.  Consequently, the default 
construction rules that governed contracts 35 years ago cannot be 
the ones that govern today’s construction contracts.  Unbelievably, 
this is what actually happens in Peru.  Hence, in many occasions the 
risk allocations of the default commercial rules do not respond to 
what the parties want, but instead respond to what the parties don’t 
want. 
 When the legislators of the Peruvian Civil Code designed the 
sale contract rules, the legislative intent pertained to real-estate 
contracts.  35 years later, however, judges and arbitrators have to 
apply these default commercial rules to share purchase agreements. 
This method is completely irrational.  The worst part is, some of 
these outdated rules are mandatory, so the parties are not entitled to 
contract around them. 
 Construction projects have changed drastically over the last 
35 years.  In the field of Lex Mercatoria, it is often said that Lex 
Constructionis (i.e., Lex Mercatoria applied to construction) is in 
constant evolution.  FIDIC (Fédération Internationale Des 
Ingénieurs-Conseils or in English, International Federation of 
Consulting Engineers) model contracts, for example, are continually 
modified.  It is illogical, therefore, to create state rules that allocate 
risks in the construction sector.  Inevitably, the new needs of trade 
will demand new default rules, and the provisions of the Civil Code 
will be serious obstacles to commercial traffic. 
 The needs of merchants change much faster than it is 
possible to imagine.  Obviously, it does not make sense that default 
commercial rules should be modified in a closed room by 
legislators.  It is inexcusable that the commercial rules by which 
risks are allocated remain the same 35 years later.  
 Designing a State rule by which risks are allocated to one 
side or the other is to create a keyless padlock that will remain closed 
for years.  By contrast, the advantage of Lex Mercatoria over any 
State rule is that it can easily be adapted to the new expectations of 
merchants.  It is flexible by nature.  The legislator has to let the Lex 
Mercatoria do its job. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/3
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III. HOW ARE SOCIAL ORDERS CREATED? 
Praxeology is not exactly a science, but rather a methodology 
that studies the logical structure of human action.24  In this regard, it 
focuses its analysis on individuals and assumes as a premise that 
human beings exhibit perfect rationality.25 
Although the term "praxeology" was first used by the German 
philosopher Clemens Timpler, it is often associated with intellectuals 
of the Austrian school of economics, such as Mises and Hayek.26  Both 
authors explain that the actions of individuals interested only in their 
own welfare, even though they are not deliberately trying to do so, 
ends up creating social orders. 
The structures formed by traditional human practices are 
neither natural in the sense of being genetically determined, nor 
artificial in the sense of being the product of intelligent design.  They 
are the result of a process of winnowing or sifting, directed by the 
differential advantages gained by groups from practices adopted for 
some unknown and perhaps purely accidental reasons.27 
Mises and Hayek argue that social orders are accidentally self-
generated.  They do not appear as a result of a natural need, nor as an 
arbitrary product of society.  Social order is not a deliberate plan of 
designers with poor information.28  The Austrian school of economics 
claims that the spontaneous appearance of order arises from an 
                                                            
24 In that sense, Mises states that “the field of our science is human 
action, not the psychological events which result in an action. It is precisely this 
which distinguishes the general theory of human action, praxeology, from 
psychology. The theme of psychology is the internal events that result or can 
result in a definite action. The theme of praxeology is action as such.” LUDWIG V. 
MISES, A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS: HUMAN ACTION 11–12 (The Scholars ed., 
1998). 
25 See NEW STUDIES, supra note 21, at 5. 
26 MISES, supra note 24, at 20. In this regard, Mises states that “[o]ut of 
the political economy of the classical school emerges the general theory of human 
action, praxeology. The economic or catallactic problems are embedded in a more 
general science, and can no longer be severed from this connection. No treatment 
of economic problems proper can avoid starting from acts of choice; economics 
becomes a part, although the hitherto best elaborated part, of a more universal 
science, praxeology.” Id. at 3. 
27 See 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE 
MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 155 (1998) (mentioning the essay “The Three 
Sources of Human Values”) [hereinafter LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY]. 
28 MISES, supra note 24, at 36.  
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apparent chaos, a notion which may at first seem counterintuitive. 
With respect to praxeology, Hayek has stated that: 
 
It must suffice for the moment to show that this constructivist 
interpretation of social formations is by no means merely harmless 
philosophical speculation, but an assertion of fact from which conclusions 
are derived concerning both the explanation of social processes and the 
opportunities for political action. The factually erroneous assertion, from 
which the constructivists derive such far-reaching consequences and 
demands, appears to me to be that the complex order of our modern society 
is exclusively due to the circumstance that men have been guided in their 
actions by foresight – an insight into the connections between case and 
effect – or at least that it could have arisen through design. What I want to 
show is that men are in their conduct never guided exclusively by their 
understanding of the causal connections between particular known means 
and certain desired ends, but always also by rules of conduct of which they 
are rarely aware, which they certainly have not consciously invented, and 
that to discern the function and significance of this is a difficult and only 
partially achieved task of scientific effort.29 
 
Like Adam Smith’s invisible hand, the Austrian school of 
economics argues that social order is not created deliberately, but, on 
the contrary, accidentally.  In this regard, Menger proposed that the 
origin, formulation and the ultimate process of all social institutions 
including law are essentially the same as the “spontaneous order” 
Adam Smith described for markets.30 
Markets guided by Smith’s invisible hand coordinate 
interactions, and so does customary law.  These systems develop 
because, through a process of trial and error, it is found that the actions 
they are intended to coordinate are performed more effectively under 
one institutional arrangement or process than under another.  The more 
effective institutions and practices replace the less effective.31 
Consequently, social orders are not created in a planned way, 
                                                            
29 NEW STUDIES, supra note 21, at 6–7 (emphasis in original). 
30 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NATIONS (1937) (discussing the improvement in 
productive powers of labour of nations).  
31 Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 
S. ECON. J. 644, 644 (1989). 
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but rather through spontaneous order.32  As explained by Hayek: 
 
By “order” we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a 
multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that 
we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of 
the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least 
expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.33 
 
The example par excellence of a social order created 
spontaneously is language. No central body created language.34  The 
thousands of languages and dialects that exist in the world were 
created through a spontaneous process.  In Hayek’s words: 
 
We need merely to consider language, which today nobody still believes 
to have been ‘invented’ by a rational being, in order to see that reason and 
civilization develop in constant mutual interaction. But what we know no 
longer question with regard to language (though even that is 
comparatively recent) is by no means generally accepted with regard to 
morals, law, the skills of handicrafts, or social institutions. We are still too 
easily led to assume that these phenomena, which are clearly the results of 
human action, must also have been consciously designed by a human 
                                                            
32 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 158. In that 
sense, Hayek has stated that “what on an earlier occasion I have called the twin 
concepts of evolution and spontaneous order enables us to account for the 
persistence of these complex structures, not by a simple conception of one-
directional laws of cause and effect, but by a complex interaction of patterns 
which Professor Donald Campbell described as ‘downward causation.’” Id. 
33 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 36 (emphasis 
omitted). 
34 In this regard, Menger has stated that “it might be pointed out that 
other social institutions, language, law, morals, but especially numerous 
institutions of economy, have come into being without any express agreement, 
without legislative compulsion, even without any consideration of public interest, 
merely through the impulse of individual interests and as a result of the activation 
of these interests. The organization of the traffic in goods in markets which recur 
periodically and are held in definite localities, the organization of society by 
separation of professions and the division of labor, trade customs, etc., are nothing 
but institutions which most eminently serve the interests of the common good and 
whose origin seems at first glance to be based necessarily on agreement or state 
power. They are, however, not the result of agreement, contract, law, or special 
consideration of the public interest by individuals, but the result of efforts serving 
individual interests.” 3 CARL MENGER, INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 157 (Louis Schneider, ed., 1985) (emphasis omitted). 
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mind, in circumstances created for the purposes which they serve – that is, 
that they are what Max Weber called wert-rationale products. In short, we 
are misled into thinking that morals, law, skills and social institutions can 
only be justified in so far as they correspond to some preconceived 
design.35 
 
There are many other phenomena that have developed over 
time spontaneously.36  In this regard, Hayek suggests that: 
 
Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, 
were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or 
at least as owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design. This 
intentionalist or pragmatic account of history found its fullest expression 
in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract, first in 
Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct follower 
of Descartes . . . . 
Yet the basic assumption underlying the belief that man has achieved 
mastery of his surroundings mainly through his capacity for logical 
deduction from explicit premises is factually false, and any attempt to 
confine his actions to what could thus be justified would deprive him of 
many of the most effective means to success that have been available to 
him. It is simply not true that our actions owe their effectiveness solely or 
chiefly to knowledge which we can state in words and which can therefore 
constitute the explicit premises of a syllogism. Many of the institutions of 
society which are indispensable conditions for the successful pursuit of 
                                                            
35 NEW STUDIES, supra note 21, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
36 White explains that “[t]he concept of spontaneous order was not 
original with Menger, but he is unquestionably one of its major developers and 
expositors. The ‘tradition of spontaneous order’ in social thought, as Norman 
Barry has shown, is both long and rich. Yet if one name from each of the last three 
centuries could be chosen to exemplify the tradition, the names would be: Adam 
Smith, Carl Menger, and Friedrich A. Hayek. Before Smith there were noteworthy 
contributions to non-intentionalist social theory by Bernard Mandeville, David 
Hume, and Adam Ferguson. Smith is well known today for his simile likening 
spontaneous social ordering forces to an ‘invisible hand,’ of course, and for his 
explanation of how the division of labor is promoted by market forces stemming 
from the pursuit of self-interest. Between Smith and Menger valuable applications 
or extensions of the spontaneous order concept were made by the French 
economists Frederic Bastiat and Gustave de Molinari, by the British free banking 
advocates Thomas Hodgskin and Samuel Bailey, and by the sociologist Herbert 
Spencer.” Lawrence B. White, Introduction to the New York University Press 
Edition, in INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF SOCIAL SCIENCES vii, xvi 
(Louis Schneider ed., 1985). 
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our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices 
which have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose 
in view. We live in a society in which we can successfully orientate 
ourselves, and in which our actions have a good chance of achieving their 
aims, not only because our fellows are governed by known aims or known 
connections between means and ends, but because they are also confined 
by rules whose purpose or origin we often do not know and of whose very 
existence we are often not aware.37 
 
This is typical of the evolution of life: the rules of transit, the 
market economy, the price system, money and even the existence of 
queues to enter a certain place.38  “The brain is an organ enabling us 
to absorb, but not to design culture.”39  The evolution of millions of 
brains participating in the world is useful for absorbing cultural 
tradition, but distinct from a brain’s biological evolution.40 
                                                            
37 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 10–11. 
38 “The structures formed by traditional human practices are not artificial 
in the sense of being the product of intelligent design, but the result of a process 
of winnowing or sifting, directed by the differential advantages gained by groups 
from practices adopted by the differential advantages gained by groups from 
practices adopted by some unknown and perhaps purely accidental reasons.” 3 
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 155. 
39 Id. at 157 (emphasis omitted).  But, it would be absurd to assume that 
we could ever ascertain all these particular facts. If at a given moment someone 
could know the sum total of all the particular facts, which are dispersed among 
the millions or billions of people living at the time, he may be in a position to 
bring about a more efficient order of human productive efforts than that achieved 
by the market. Science can help us to a better theoretical understanding of the 
interconnections. But, science cannot significantly help us to ascertain all the 
widely dispersed, rapidly fluctuating particular circumstances of time and place 
which determine the order of a great complex society. Id. at 173–74 (emphasis in 
original). 
40 Id. at 157. In this regard, Hayek has stated that “Man did not adopt 
new rules of conduct because he was intelligent. He became intelligent by 
submitting to new rules of conduct. The most important insight which so many 
rationalists still resist and are even inclined to brand as a superstition, namely that 
man has not only never invented his most beneficial institutions, from language 
to morals and law, and even today does not yet understand why he should preserve 
them when they satisfy neither his instincts nor his reason, still needs to be 
emphasized. The basic tools of civilization—language, morals, law and money— 
are all the result of spontaneous growth and not of design . . . Although the Left 
is still inclined to brand all such efforts as apologetics, it may still be one of the 
most important tasks of our intelligence to discover the significance of rules we 
17
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None of the examples mentioned above Rules of conduct were 
not created in a constructivist way.  They were created spontaneously 
and could not have been created by an individual mind because these 
rules formed the basis for reason.41   Hence, Hayek points out that “the 
reason for this is that the ‘data from which the economic calculus starts 
are never for the whole society “given” to a single mind which could 
work out the implications, and can never be so given.”42  For instance, 
one of the most emblematic phrases of Hayek is “We have never 
designed our economic system.  We were not intelligent enough for 
that.”43 
In White's words: 
 
To exemplify the concept of a spontaneously evolved social institution 
Menger restates his own theory of the origin of money (pp. 152-155). This 
marvelous theory shows that the use of certain goods as money is not 
originally invented by the state or adopted by a conscious social 
agreement, but is arrived at through a natural convergence of self-seeking 
actions in a market setting. The same approach can be extended to explain 
the origins of advanced monetary institutions such as coinage, banknotes, 
checks, and clearinghouses. Menger identifies several other major 
institutions as undesigned or, “organic” in origin: language, law, morals, 
trade customs, professionalism, cities, and tribes (or primitive “states”).44 
 
Therefore, in order to explain the economic aspects of large 
social systems, I have to account for the course of a flowing stream, 
constantly adapting itself as a whole to changes in circumstances of 
which each participant can know only a small fraction, and for a 
hypothetical state of equilibrium determined by a set of ascertainable 
data.45 
Thus, the peculiar character of the problem of a rational 
economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge 
of the circumstances of which we must make use never exist in 
                                                            
never deliberately made, and the obedience to which builds more complex orders 
that we can understand.” Id. at 163 (emphasis in original). 
41 Id. at 157. 
42 The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 20, at 519. 
43 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 164 (emphasis 
in original). 
44 White, supra note 36, at xvii. 
45 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 159. 
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concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess.46 
This ‘world 3’, as Sir Karl Popper has called it, though at all 
times kept in existence by millions of separate brains participating in 
it, is the outcome of a process of evolution distinct from the biological 
evolution of the brain, the elaborate structure of which became useful 
when there was a cultural tradition to absorb.  Or, to put it differently, 
mind can exist only as part of another independently existing distinct 
structure or order, though that order persists and can develop only 
because millions of minds constantly absorb and modify parts of it.47 
As Hayek explains: “The conception of an already fully 
developed mind designing the institutions which made life in society 
possible is contrary to all we know about the evolution of man.”48 
As rightly stated by Professor Ferrero, there appears to be a 
solution to the problem, “that the elite of mankind acquire a 
consciousness of the limitation of the human mind, at once simple and 
profound enough, humble and sublime enough, so that Western 
civilization will resign itself to its inevitable disadvantages.”49 
In summary, we can conclude that social orders are created 
through a spontaneous order.  As Ferguson points out, many human 
institutions “are the result of human action, but not the execution of 
any human design.”50 
IV. WHO SHOULD BE IN CHARGE OF CREATING OF CREATING 
DEFAULT COMMERCIAL RULES IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES? 
 If we believe that commercial law is generated externally to 
society; that is, if there is someone who gives order to society as the 
result of superior intelligence, authority or force, it is logical to assume 
that commercial law should be created monopolistically.  
                                                            
46 Id. at 519. 
47 Id. at 157. 
48 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 17. 
49 GUGLIELMO FERRERO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POWER: THE GREAT 
POLITICAL CRISIS OF HISTORY 318 (1942). 
50 ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 122 
(5th ed. 1767). In the same sense, Hayek has stated that “a large part of social 
formations, although the result of human action, is not of human design.” See 
NEW STUDIES, supra note 21, at 5. 
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On the other hand, if we think that commercial law is not 
designed, but rather is developed praxeologically, we will inevitably 
conclude that commercial law should be created spontaneously.51 
 In my view, the formation of commercial law is not far from 
the formation of language, traffic rules, the market economy, the 
price system, money, and so on.52  By contrast, mutatis mutandi, 
they are formed following the same process. 
 As one commentator noted:  
 
Commerce and commercial law have developed conterminously, without 
the aid of and often despite the interferences of the coercive power of 
nation-states because there is a mechanism in place.  Commercial law 
itself is analogous to the price system in that it facilitates interaction and 
makes exchange more efficient . . .  Commercial law develops directly 
from the market exchange process as business practice and custom 
evolves.53 
 
 As a popular French song said: how wise nature is, that 
makes rivers pass just below the bridges.  The funny thing is that it's 
just the other way around.  We have to stop thinking of the law as a 
bridge that some nameless engineer has built.  Instead, we must 
                                                            
51 Enrique Ghersi, El carácter competitivo de las fuentes del derecho, 7 
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA Y DERECHO [J. ECON. & L.] 45, 50 (2010). 
52 In this regard, Menger states that “[i]f the theory of the ‘organic origin’ 
of law is to be more than an empty phrase, if the above problem is really to be 
solved, if we are actually to become clearly aware of the ‘organic origin’ of law 
as opposed to its social-pragmatic genesis, then, on the contrary, it is necessary 
for us to examine its nature. It is necessary to examine the course of the process 
by which law appears without positive legislation, that process which one can 
always call ‘organic . . . ’   MENGER, supra note 34, at 223–24 (Appendix VIII). 
“The special contents that law assumes in a concrete case, before legislation 
begins to shape them, depend on the particular conditions of the population from 
whose mind law originated. Directed in its original form toward assuring the most 
important and most general individual interests of the people of the nation, it 
broadens and deepens gradually with increasing intercourse and the growing 
insight of individuals into their interests. It is affirmed by custom and is shaken 
and finally altered by the change of those conditions to which it owes its origin. 
Certain conditions resulting from general human nature and thus appearing 
everywhere produce similar institutions of law everywhere by their nature, while 
tribal differences and variety of external conditions and mental spheres result in 
differences in law.” Id. at 228–29. 
53 Benson, supra note 31, at 645. 
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think of the law as the river, which flows with all the impetus and 
irregularity of nature. 
 
 In the words of Leoni: 
 
People who ignore this fact ought to take seriously a couplet once sung in 
a cabaret in Montmartre:  
 Voyez comme la nature a en un bon sens bien profunds Á faire passer les 
fleuves justement sous les ponts. 
(See how nature had the extreme good sense To make the rivers flow 
exactly under the bridges).54 
 
 Nevertheless, we have always lived under the paradigm that 
default commercial rules must be created in a constructivist way, so 
we have always believed that legislative production must be 
centralized and hierarchical.55  Hence, Kelsen—the foremost 
precursor of constructivism with respect to the formation of 
commercial rules—coined the term “positive law,” that is to say, 
“laid law.”56 
 In words of Professor De Jesús: 
 
The most serious criticism comes from the supporters of traditional state 
positivism and conflicts of law. For these scholars . . .  it is simply 
unacceptable to admit that a rule of law can have a private origin . . . a vast 
number of sectors of the economy [if not all] . . . have been witnessing an 
extraordinary proliferation of non-state rules of law contained in new 
practices, codes of conduct, new contracts, model contracts, doctrinal 
codifications and arbitral jurisprudence.57 
                                                            
54 BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 50–51 (1961) (emphasis in 
original).   
55 In this regard, Hayek has stated that “it seemed to me necessary to 
introduce the term “constructivism” as a specific name for a manner of thinking 
that in the past has often, but misleadingly, been described as ‘rationalism’. The 
basic conception of this constructivism can perhaps be expressed in the simplest 
manner by the innocent sounding formula that, since man has himself created the 
institutions of society and civilization, he must also be able to alter them at will 
so as to satisfy his desires or wishes. It is almost 50 years since I first heard and 
was greatly impressed by this formula.” NEW STUDIES, supra note 21, at 49. 
56 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 15 (1967). 
57 Alfredo De Jesús O., The Prodigious Story of the Lex Petrolea and the 
Rhinoceros Philosophical Aspects of the Transnational Legal Order of the 
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 There is absolutely no reason why commercial default rules 
should be designed by lawmakers in a closed room, while Lex 
Mercatoria has effective answers for all types of contingencies not 
foreseen in a given contract through non-State legal rules.58  The 
idea that the State is necessary to create default commercial rules is 
a paradigm.  Keep in mind that rules are social institutions that 
existed before the State had the competence to create them.  
Rothbard, for example, has stated that “the entire law merchant was 
developed, not by the State or in State courts, but by private 
merchant courts. It was only much later that government took over 
mercantile law from its development in merchants’ courts.”59  
 Thus, the idea that commercial default rules must be the 
product of the will of the legislator is a constructivist fallacy that 
collides head-on with the spontaneous process that characterizes its 
formation.  Commercial law is neither artificial nor rationally 
designed. 
 In this regard, Hayek has stated that: 
 
To modern man, on the other hand, the belief that all law governing human 
action is the product of legislation appears so obvious that the contention 
that law is older than law-making has almost the character of a paradox. 
Yet there can be no doubt that law existed for ages before it occurred to 
man that he could make or alter it . . . In the form in which it is now widely 
held, however, namely that all law is, can be, and ought to be, the product 
of the free invention of a legislator, it is factually false, an erroneous 
product of that constructivist rationalism which we described earlier.  
 
We shall later see that the whole conception of legal positivism which 
derives all law from the will of a legislator is a product of the intentionalist 
                                                            
Petroleum Society, 1 TRANSNAT’L PETROLEUM L. INST. 1, 12 (2012). 
58 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 274 (1983); see also BRUCE L. BENSON, THE 
ENTERPRISE OF THE LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 12 (1990) (“Law can be 
imposed from above by some coercive authority, such as a king, a legislature, or 
a supreme court, or law can develop ‘from the ground’ as customs and practice 
evolve. Law imposed from the top—authoritarian law—typically requires the 
support of a powerful minority; law developed from the bottom up—customary 
law—requires widespread acceptance.”).  
59 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN 
MANIFESTO 283 (2nd ed. 2006). 
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fallacy characteristic of constructivism, a relapse into those design 
theories of human institutions which stand in irreconcilable conflict with 
all we know about the evolution of law and most other human 
institutions.60 
 
 The debate between Kelsen and Hayek, when applied to the 
creation of commercial default rules, mirrors the inherent conflict 
between constructivism and spontaneous order.  While Kelsen 
would argue that default commercial rules must be designed by the 
legislator, Hayek, by contrast, would argue that default commercial 
rules are formed progressively and spontaneously as a consequence 
of human action. 
 In that regard, Hayek attempted to show why legal 
positivism, with its belief that every legal rule must be derivable 
from a conscious act of legislation, and that all conceptions of justice 
are the product of particular interests, is conceptually and 
historically mistaken.61  Thus, Hayek criticizes Kelsen stating that 
“[l]aw is thus for Kelsen a deliberate construction, serving known 
particular interests.”62 
 In this regard, Hayek explains that: 
 
The logic of the positivist argument would be compelling only if its 
assertion that all law derives from the will of a legislator did not merely 
mean, as it does in the system of Kelsen, that its validity is derived from 
some act of deliberate will, but that its content is so derived. This, 
however, is factually often not the case. A legislator, in trying to maintain 
a going spontaneous order, cannot pick and choose any rules he likes to 
confer validity upon them, if he wants to achieve his aim. His power is not 
unlimited because it rests on the fact that some of the rules which he makes 
enforceable are regarded as right by the citizens, and the acceptance by 




                                                            
60 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 73 (emphasis 
added). 
61 Id. at 173–74. 
62 NEW STUDIES, supra note 21, at 18. 
63 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 61 (emphasis 
added). 
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 Thus, when the parties execute contracts and allocate risks 
recurrently in a certain way, they are casting votes.  It is this constant 
vote of merchants repeated over time that determines the 
progressive formation of Lex Mercatoria.  Through the execution of 
contracts, they are allocating risks to one side or the other. From an 
economic point of view, contracts are ultimately nothing more than 
the distribution of risks. 
 In Benson's words: 
 
The commercial sector is completely capable of establishing and enforcing 
its own laws. 
A second purpose is to illustrate that modern commercial law is, in fact, 
largely made by the merchant community despite governmental efforts to 
take over provision of such law. Commerce is an evolving process of 
interaction and reciprocity which is simultaneously facilitated by and 
leads to an evolving system of commercial law . . .  
In the case of customary commercial law, traditions and practice evolve 
to produce the observed spontaneous order.64 
 
 Since all merchants execute contracts and, consequently, 
cast votes, the decision as to how the risks of a given contract should 
be allocated is absolutely democratic.  Through their actions, 
merchants create Lex Mercatoria.  The latter, therefore, is not 
created in the same way in which a law is created.  As Bullard states, 
“the lex mercatoria was and is created every day by merchants.”65  
Fuller states that Lex Mercatoria “consists of reciprocal 
expectations that arise out of human interaction.”66  Therefore, it 
could best be defined as a language of interaction. 
 As Benson explains, commercial law is formed through a 
process of natural selection.  When problems arise, the practices that 
are most efficient in facilitating the exchange displace those that are 
                                                            
64 Benson, supra note 31, at 644. 
65 Alfredo Bullard González, Comprando justicia: ¿genera el mercado 
de arbitraje reglas jurídicas predecibles? [Buying Justice: Does the arbitration 
market generate predictable legal rules?], 53 THĒMIS 71, 86 (2007) (trans. by 
Fabio Núñez del Prado Ch.). 
66 THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. 
FULLER 673 (Kenneth L. Winston ed., 1981). 
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inefficient.67  Hume explains that rules should be discovered through 
a method of trial and error, which is the most appropriate way of 
resolving conflicts.68  As Hayek argues: 
 
The development of such rules will evidently involve a continuous 
interaction between the rules of law and expectations: while new rules will 
be laid down to protect existing expectations, every new rule will also tend 
to create new expectations. As some of the prevailing expectations will 
always conflict with each other, the judge will constantly have to decide 
which is to be treated as legitimate and in doing so will provide the basis 
for new expectations. This will in some measure always be an 
experimental process, since the judge (and the same applies to the law-
maker) will never be able to foresee all the consequences of the rule he 
lays down, and will often fail in his endeavor to reduce the sources of 
conflicts of expectations. Any new rule intended to settle one conflict may 
well prove to give rise to new conflicts at another point, because the 
establishment of a new rule always acts on an order of actions that the law 
alone does not wholly determine. Yet it is only by their effects on that 
order of actions, effects which will be discovered only by trial and error, 
that the adequacy of the rules can be judged.69 
 
 Default commercial rules shouldn’t be produced in a 
monopolistic and constructivist way, but rather spontaneously.  
These rules should be flexible and should evolve over time to adapt 
to the new needs and expectations of merchants.70  As Rothbard 
states, Lex Mercatoria “[was] not decided arbitrarily by any king or 
legislature; they grew up over centuries by applying rational—and 
very often libertarian—to the cases before them.”71 
                                                            
67 BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT STATE 
32 (1990). 
68 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 315 (David F. Norton 
& Mary J. Norton eds., 2011). 
69 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 27, at 102. 
70 James Buchanan asked, “if government is dismantled how do rights 
re-emerge and come to command respect? How do ‘laws’ emerge that carry with 
them general respect for their ‘legitimacy’”? He contended that collective action 
would be necessary to devise a social contract or constitution to define rights and 
to establish the institutions to enforce those rights. But collective action can be 
achieved through individual agreements, with useful rules spreading to other 
members of a group. See generally James M. Buchanan, Before Public Choice, in 
ANARCHY, STATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 77, 77 (Edward Stringham ed., 2005). 
71 ROTHBARD, supra note 59, at 283. 
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 In conclusion, default commercial rules should not be an 
invention of the legislature, but rather the result of a praxeological 
process.  The constructivist and hierarchical structure of the design 
of commercial rules has harmed the development of commercial law 
and has frustrated the expectations of merchants. 
V. WHAT IS LEX MERCATORIA AND WHERE CAN WE FIND IT? 
 There is no consensus regarding the definition of Lex 
Mercatoria.72  However, there have been several attempts to define 
Lex Mercatoria.73  
 Berthold Goldman has defined Lex Mercatoria as “a set of 
general principles and customary rules spontaneously referred to or 
elaborated in the framework of international trade, without reference 
to a particular national system of law.”74  Julian Lew defines it as a 
“non-national or transnational commercial law [which] governs 
those aspects of international trade not regulated by some national 
law, and are applied by arbitrators.”75  Peter North defines Lex 
Mercatoria as “a set of legal rules not tied to the law of any 
country.”76  Bernardo Cremades and Steven Plehn describe the Lex 
Mercatoria as “a single autonomous body of law created by the 
international business community.”77  Ole Lando has defined Lex 
Mercatoria as customs and usages of international trade, to the rules 
of law which are common to all or most of the States engaged in 
international trade or to those States which are connected to the 
                                                            
72 Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five 
Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 149–51 (Ian 
Brownlie & Maarten Bos eds., 1987). 
73 See Vanessa L.D. Wilkinson, The New Lex Mercatoria: Reality or 
Academic Fantasy, 12 J. INT’L ARB. 103, 104 (1995). 
74 Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law – 
The Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 113, 116 (Julian DM Lew ed., 1987). 
75 Julian DM Lew, Determination of Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and the 
Public Policy Limitations on that Jurisdiction, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 74, at 231.  
76 PETER NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN COMMON 
LAW JURISDICTIONS 109 (1993). 
77 Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria 
and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 317, 324 (1984). 
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dispute.78  Finally, Vanessa Wilkinson states that Lex Mercatoria 
“incorporates the common customs and usages of the business 
community of each State, and, where there are gaps, supplements it 
with equity and creativity of the arbitrator.”79 
 In my view, Lex Mercatoria is a normative activity 
permanently enriched by the activity of merchants, including 
contractual practices (e.g., standardized clauses, standard contracts, 
and general contracting conditions), model laws and arbitration 
jurisprudence--with aspirations to standardize commercial law.  In 
this regard, the essential characteristic of Lex Mercatoria is its need 
to satisfy the expectations of merchants. 
 Professor De Jesús has pointed out, for example, that Lex 
Petrolea—Lex Mercatoria applied to the oil sector—is enriched by 
the following sources: 
 
Besides the creation of the ever evolving series of best oilfield practices 
at the origin of much of the transnational rules of the petroleum society, 
one could mention the rules arising from (i) the new contracts and clauses 
that have emerged from the evolution of transnational petroleum contracts; 
(ii) the standardization and institutionalization of some of those contracts 
and clauses by the practice and the works of professional associations; (iii) 
the publication of doctrinal codifications of rules potentially applicable to 
oil and gas contracts; and (iv) the works and reflections of both contract 
and investment treaty arbitral tribunals.80 
                                                            
78 Ole Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, 2 ARB. 
INT’L 104, 107 (2014). 
79 Wilkinson, supra note 73, at 104. 
80 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 23. In this regard, Professor De Jesús 
has stated that “[t]he first principle is that these transnational rules are to be found 
or extracted from all the sources of law (state or non-state sources of law). These 
rules may be created by the petroleum society itself or incorporated from other 
legal orders. In this regard, they can either be created by industry practices, 
standards and usages or they can be incorporated from international conventions 
or doctrinal codifications (i.e. the Unidroit or Lando principles or the works of the 
Gandolfi and von Bar commissions). Members of the petroleum society, including 
arbitrators, may also incorporate general principles of law as transnational rules 
to the Lex Petrolea. Regarding the incorporation of general principles of the 
transnational legal orders, Professor Kahn affirms, for example, that when an 
arbitrator applies and incorporates a principle of law, he transforms it in a certain 
way, detaching it from its source which might as well be a national or an 
international legal order and transnationalizes it. The only requirement for their 
incorporation in the Lex Petrolea is that they meet the test of serving and 
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 On the other hand, one of the most important sources of Lex 
Mercatoria is arbitral jurisprudence.  The paradigm of 
confidentiality in arbitration has been relativized.  Extracts of 
thousands of arbitral awards are published in multiple databases.  To 
the extent that arbitrators decide quite frequently how the risks of a 
given contract should be allocated in complex and unprecedented 
situations, the awards constitute a privileged source of Lex 
Mercatoria, even more so when considering that arbitrators are 
specialists in commercial law and technical matters. 
In this regard, Professor De Jesús has stated that: 
 
Unsurprisingly, an important example of this increasing interest on the Lex 
Mercatoria and transnational law can be found in the area of “international 
arbitration” – more appropriately referred to as “transnational arbitration.” 
. . . . King & Spalding’s Doak Bishop believes that arbitral awards 
involving petroleum issues have developed the beginnings of a Lex 
Petrolea that serves to instruct and regulate the international petroleum 
industry.  In our opinion, the debate on transnational legal orders is no 
longer focused on whether or not they exist, but on their plurality and their 
content and methodology.81 
 
 Some specialists claim that Lex Mercatoria is formed by 
universal principles that can be applied to multiple diverse 
situations.82  In my view, however, Lex Mercatoria is formed 
through the transactions that merchants execute every day.  Through 
the latter, merchants decide to allocate risks in one way or the other, 
and Lex Mercatoria is formed organically.83 
 Lex Mercatoria, hence, cannot be defined as a pyramid with 
clearly established hierarchies, but as a network formed by a 
conglomeration of rules that are scattered in many places that come 
from different sources.  Thus, if the old paradigm was represented 
                                                            
satisfying the needs and interests of the transnational petroleum society. In short, 
transnational rules and transnational legal orders such as the Lex Petrolea are 
constantly enriched from all sources of law.” Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). 
81 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 20–21.  
82 This was argued by many French scholars in the Beaune Meeting titled 
“The New World Order of Economic Relations in the Light of Arbitral 
Jurisprudence” organized by the ICC International Court of Arbitration which 
took place on September 27, 2014.  
83 See De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 28–29. 
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by a pyramid (a pyramid of norms), the new paradigm is represented 
by a network, in which the pluralities of legal orders interact.84 
 The essential characteristics of Lex Mercatoria are the 
following: 
A. Its meticulousness 
 Within the framework of a contractual relationship, 
innumerable complex controversies may arise that cannot 
necessarily be solved through the application of positive law.  
Sometimes the issues of these disputes are so complex that even the 
parties are unable to foresee their occurrence.  Unlike state law, Lex 
Mercatoria usually has an answer for all these situations.  As 
discussed above, to the extent that model contracts are the result of 
thousands of transactions, they are extremely detailed. 
 Lex Mercatoria reaches a level of meticulousness that Civil 
Code rules could never attain.  Inevitably the latter satisfies better 
the needs and expectations of merchants. 
B. Its universality 
 There is an invisible hand that makes the risk distributions 
of every single contract universal.  In fact, if the clauses of an energy 
contract in Kenya are compared with those of a similar contract in 
the United States, the same contractual creature will be found. 
 Regardless of the country, the distribution of contractual 
risks tends to be virtually the same.  In that sense, Professor De Jesús 
has stated that “[f]or some authors, at least 80% of the contents of 
most transnational petroleum contracts include the same clauses.”85 
C. Its sectorialization 
 Because Lex Mercatoria is sectorialized, there is no general 
framework.  Instead, there is a specific Lex Mercatoria unique to 
each economic sector.  Thus, there is a Lex Constructionis, for 
international construction law; a Lex Petrolea, laws for the 
international oil and gas sectors; a Lex Informatica, a body of 
transnational rules for the informatic sector; a Lex Sportiva for the 
                                                            
84 See id.  
85 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 23 (emphasis added). 
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transnational sports sector, and so on.  In short, Lex Mercatoria 
varies from industry to industry. 
D. Its legitimacy 
 Having a system in which default commercial rules are 
created by virtue of Lex Mercatoria generates several positive 
externalities.  Non-state legal rules are typically seen as legitimate 
by members of society.  This is to be expected, considering that such 
rules were created by merchants.  None of the latter could argue, 
therefore, that a rule is arbitrary. 
E. Its effectiveness 
 Finally, Lex Mercatoria “is effective because it provides 
courts [and arbitrators] with repeated opportunities to apply their 
rules across contexts.  And those opportunities exist because parties 
[only] accept the rules that can be applied in that way.”86 
VI. EXAMPLE: HOW ARE DEFAULT COMMERCIAL RULES CREATED 
IN CONSTRUCTION LAW? 
 One of the most illustrative examples mentioned by 
Professor De Jesús is the FIDIC contracts.  Such contract models 
have become the standard model of construction contracts most used 
internationally. 
 The first edition of these contracts was published in 1957.87  
Since then, revisions and new versions of these contract models 
have been published.88  It is worth noting that, in 1999, a whole new 
generation of FIDIC contracts was born that reflected the new 
demands arising from the growing internationalization of the 




                                                            
86 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1551. 
87 THE RAINBOW SUITE: THE 1999 FIDIC SUITE 1 
http://fidic.org/sites/default/files/FIDIC-rainbow-suite-2012.pdf. 
88 See generally id. 
89 Id. at 1. 
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 As a prestigious FIDIC specialist have noted: 
 
The FIDIC Books have been conceived for all types of infrastructure 
projects and include a multiplicity of services provided by contractors 
(designs, consulting, construction, operation, etc.). For practical purposes, 
FIDIC identifies its model contracts by colors (orange, red, yellow, silver, 
gold, green, white, among others). All contracts have the same structure: 
general conditions and specific conditions that allow the parties to include 
modifications and additions to these general conditions.90 
 
 In this regard, Salguero has stated that: 
 
Multiple advantages are derived from the utilization of the FIDIC books. 
Among others, we can mention the clear allocation of risks; the regulation 
of tests upon completion; the ways of solving nimbly controversies of a 
purely technical nature, and the causes for price revision and extension of 
deadlines. The consequence of this is that the negotiation of a construction 
contract is limited to the regulation of particular conditions in accordance 
with the specific nature of the latter, which implies greater agility in the 
development of construction projects.91 
 
 It could be argued that the FIDIC contracts are not examples 
of Lex Mercatoria because they provide model contracts that the 
parties can adopt.  If they have already entered into a FIDIC contract 
and a contingency not foreseen in the contract arises, the reasoning 
goes, the same contract cannot be applied as Lex Mercatoria.  This, 
however, is a partial analysis, for several reasons. 
 First of all, FIDIC contracts have reached such an incredible 
level of meticulousness that it is very unlikely that a contingency not 
foreseen by the parties in the contract arises.  FIDIC has been 
developing over time since 1957, so it regulates virtually all 
situations that may arise.  Still, even if an unprecedented situation 
arises, it would be absurd to believe that a contingency that has not 
been regulated in FIDIC will find an answer in a Civil Code. 
 In addition, it is worth mentioning that FIDIC contracts are 
                                                            
90 Jorge Salguero García, Los Contratos FIDIC [The FIDIC Contracts], 
Escuela de Organización Industrial [School of Industrial Organization] (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://www.eoi.es/blogs/embacon/2012/04/02/los-contratos-fidic/ (trans. 
by Fabio Núñez del Prado Ch.). 
91 Id. (trans. by Fabio Núñez del Prado Ch.). 
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applied as Lex Mercatoria precisely in those cases in which the 
parties celebrated a construction contract that was not based on the 
FIDIC models.  Thus, if a situation that is not foreseen in the contract 
arises, it would be much more efficient to apply the FIDIC clauses 
as Lex Mercatoria instead of arbitrary rules contained in a Civil 
Code.  Such rules are divorced from reality and, in many cases, have 
not been amended for decades. 
 FIDIC contracts are Lex Constructionis par excellence.  The 
FIDIC model contracts are nothing more than the result of a constant 
vote that the merchants have casted for construction contracts.  
FIDIC is the result of human action; of a spontaneous order that has 
determined that the model contracts are the most desirable way to 
distribute risks in construction contracts. 
 The fact that there are different types of FIDIC contracts 
identified by colors (orange, red, yellow, silver, gold, green, white, 
among others) reveals that merchants have diverse needs that must 
be satisfied differently.  FIDIC, therefore, is an excellent example 
of how the Lex Mercatoria develops gradually over time. 
VII. EXAMPLES OF DEFAULT COMMERCIAL RULES OF THE 
PERUVIAN CIVIL CODE THAT CONTRAVENE THE LEX 
MERCATORIA 
In the following section I will share some examples of 
articles from the 2015 version of the Peruvian Civil Code (1984) 
that contravene the Lex Mercatoria.  The Peruvian Code was 
originally drafted and published in Spanish.  To my knowledge, 
there are no known scholarly and freely available English 
translations of the text.  Therefore, as a native Spanish speaker, 
translations of all sections noted below are my own.  Additionally, 
all italicized words within the Code are solely my emphasis and are 
not contained within the text of the Code unless otherwise noted. I 
will start with some examples from the construction field: 
A. Who provides or manufactures the materials for the 
execution of the works 
 
Obligation of the contractor 
Article 1774º.-  The contractor is obliged: 
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. . .  
 
2.- To give immediate notice to the employer of the defects of the 
floor or of the poor quality of the materials provided by it, if they 
are discovered before or in the course of the work and may 
jeopardize their regular execution. 
 
 
Under the Peruvian Civil Code, the employer is in charge of 
providing the materials for the execution of the work.  Certainly, this 
was the commercial practice for a long time, but it has not been like 
that for many years.  At present, it is the contractor who has the 
obligation to provide or manufacture the materials for the execution 
of the works. 
Thus, in the Conditions of Contract for Construction of the 
FIDIC Red Book (1999) (“FIDIC Red Book”) there are many rules 
that suggest that in international construction practice it is the 
contractor who provides and manufactures the materials.  Similarly, 
as with the Peruvian Code, any italicized words within the text is 
solely my emphasis and is not contained within the text of the Code 
unless otherwise noted: 
 
1.1.5 Works and Goods  
. . .  
1.1.5.2 “Goods” means Contractor’s Equipment, Materials, Plant and 
Temporary Works, or any of them as appropriate.  
1.1.5.3 “Materials” means things of all kinds (other than Plant) intended 
to form or forming part of the Permanent Works, including the supply-
only materials (if any) to be supplied by the Contractor under the 
Contract. 
 
4.1. Contractor’s General Obligations 
. . .  
The Contractor shall provide the Plant and Contractor’s Documents 
specified in the Contract, and all Contractor’s Personnel, Goods, 
consumables and other things and services, whether of a temporary or 
permanent nature, required in and for this design, execution, completion 
and remedying of defects. 
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7.1. Manner of Execution 
The Contractor shall carry out the manufacture the Plant, the production 
and manufacture of Materials, and all other execution of the Works:  
(a) in the manner (if any) specified in the Contract.  
(b) in a proper workmanlike and careful manner, in accordance with 
recognized good practice, and  
(c) with properly equipped facilities and non-hazardous Materials, except 
as otherwise specified in the Contract. 
 
7.2. Samples 
The Contractor shall submit the following samples of Materials, and 
relevant information to the Engineer for consent prior to using the 
Materials in or for the Works:  
(a) manufacturer’s standard samples of Materials and samples specified in 
the Contract, all at the Contractor’s cost, and  
(b) additional samples instructed by the Engineer as a Variation.  
Each sample shall be labelled as to origin and intended use in the Works. 
 
It is evident that Article 1774º of the Peruvian Civil Code 
creates a lot of confusion and is divorced from international 
commercial practice. This is understandable, considering that article 
1774º was written more than thirty-five years ago. 
B. Person in charge of approving the variations of the works 
 
Prohibition to introduce variations 
Article 1775º.- The contractor cannot introduce variations in the 




Under the Peruvian Civil Code, the employer is in charge of 
approving the variations.  This rule, nevertheless, is completely 
outdated. In 1984, when the rules of the Peruvian Civil Code were 
drafted, it was understood that the only participants of work 
contracts were the employer and the contractor.  Today, however, 
construction contracts cannot be understood without the 
participation of the “Engineer.” 
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In accordance to rule 1.1.2.4 of the FIDIC Red Book, 
“Engineer” has the following meaning: 
 
“Engineer” means the person appointed by the Employer to act as the 
Engineer for the purposes of the Contract and name in the Appendix to 
Tender, or other person appointed from time to time by the Employer and 
notified to the Contractor under Sub-Clause 3.4 [Replacement of the 
Engineer]. 
 
The relevance of the “Engineer” is so great, that in the 
current construction contracts that the FIDIC Red Book dedicates an 
entire section to regulate its rights, obligations, authority, as well as 
different aspects with respect its competences: 
 
3. THE ENGINEER  
3.1. Engineer’s Duties and Authority 
3.2. Delegation by the Engineer 
3.3. Instructions of the Engineer 
3.4. Replacement of the Engineer 
3.5. Determinations 
 
According to the FIDIC Red Book it is the Engineer who is 
in charge of approving the variations, either by an instruction or by 
a request for the Contractor to submit a proposal. Rule 13.1 of the 
FIDIC Red Book states the following: 
 
13.1 Right to Vary 
Variations may be initiated by the Engineer at any time prior to issuing 
the Taking-Over Certificate for the Works, either by an instruction or by 
a request for the Contractor to submit a proposal. 
The Contractor shall execute and be bound by each Variation unless the 
Contractor promptly gives notice to the Engineer stating (with supporting 
particulars) that the Contractor cannot readily obtain the Goods required 
for the Variation. Upon receiving this notice, the Engineer shall cancel, 
confirm or vary the instruction. 
 . . .  
Since this is the practice of international construction, it is 
easy to see how serious is the confusion created by having the 
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employer approving the variations. 
 To make matters worse, the Peruvian lawmaker has established 
an unreasonable additional requirement: The approval of the 
variations must be in writing. This rule is really harmful and costly 
considering that in the practice of international construction, the 
speed with which the contractor must execute the works often 
requires that the variations be approved orally. 
C. Verification of the works and potential claims of the 
principal in the future 
 
 
Verification of the work 
Article 1778º.- The principal, before receiving the work, has the 
right to its verification. If the principal neglects to proceed to it 
without just cause or does not communicate its result within a 




Responsibility of the contractor for destruction, vices or ruin 
Article 1784º.- If in the course of the five years from its 
acceptance, the work is destroyed, totally or partially, or it 
presents evident danger of ruin or serious defects due to defect of 
the construction, the contractor is responsible before the 
employer or his heirs, provided that he notifies the contractor in 




Assumption of absence of contractor liability 
Article 1785º.-  The contractor bears no responsibility in the cases 
referred to in Article 1784, if it proves that the work was executed 
according to the rules of the art and in strict accordance with the 
instructions of the professionals who prepared the studies, plans 
and other necessary documents for the completion of the work, 
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All the above-mentioned rules—articles 1778º, 1784º, and 
1785º of the Peruvian Civil Code—are outdated. The rules establish 
assumptions that are simply impossible in construction contracts of 
today. 
With respect to article 1778º, the rule establishes the 
assumption that the employer neglects to proceed with the 
verification of the work without just cause or does not communicate 
its result.  This is simply impossible.  In the practice of modern 
construction contracts there is always a phase in which the employer 
take-over the works.  Rule 10.1 of the FIDIC Red Book states: 
 
10.1 Taking Over of the Works and Sections 
Except as stated in Sub-Clause 9.4 [Failure to Pass Tests on Completion], 
the Works shall be taken over by the Employer when: (i) the Works have 
been completed in accordance with the Contract, including the matters 
described in Sub-Clause 8.2 [Time for Completion] and except as allowed 
in sub-paragraph (a) below, and (ii) a Taking-Over Certificate for the 
Works has been issued, or is deemed to have been issued in accordance 
with this Sub-Clause . . . . 
 
At present, it is inconceivable that a construction contract in 
which this take-over phase is omitted.  The works are always take-
over by the employer.  What is more, after the works are take-over, 
the employer always issues a certificate that demonstrates that the 
contractor has performed all its obligations.  This suggests that it is 
absurd to have a rule in the Peruvian Civil Code that regulates the 
tacit acceptance of the works. 
With respect to article 1784, this rule establishes the 
assumption that the contractor has to respond to the employer if, 
after five years from its acceptance, the work is destroyed, totally or 
partially, or it presents evident danger of ruin or serious defects due 
to defect of the construction.  This assumption also contravenes the 
practice of international construction because, after the 
“Performance Certificate” is issued by the employer, the contractor 
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In this regard, rule 11.9 of the FIDIC Red Book states the 
following: 
 
11.9 Performance Certificate 
Performance of the Contractor’s obligations shall not be considered to 
have been completed until the Engineer has issued the Performance 
Certificate to the Contractor, stating the date on which the Contractor 
completed his obligations under the Contract. 
The Engineer shall issue the Performance Certificate within 28 days after 
the latest of the expiry dates of the Defects Notification Periods, or as soon 
thereafter as the Contractor has supplied all the Contractor’s Documents 
and completed and tested all the Works, including remedying and defects. 
A copy of the Performance Certificate shall be issued to the Employer. 
Only the Performance Certificate shall be deemed to constitute acceptance 
of the Works. 
 
In addition, it is absurd to create a rule that states that the 
contractor assumes the risk if the work is destroyed, totally or 
partially, or it presents evident danger of ruin or serious construction 
defects, because in modern construction contracts there is always a 
“Defects Notification Period” and a period in which the contractor 
is obliged to complete outstanding works and remedy defects. 
As such, rules 1.1.3.7 and 11.1 of the FIDIC Red Book states 
the following: 
 
1.1.3.7 “Defects Notification Period” means the period for notifying 
defects in the Works or a Section (as the case may be) under Sub-Clause 
11.1 [Completion of Outstanding Work and Remedying Defects], as stated 
in the Appendix to Tender (with any extension under Sub-Clause 11.3 
[Extension of Defects Notification Period], calculated from the date on 
which the Works or Section is completed as certified under Sub-Clause 
10.1 [Taking Over of the Works and Sections]. 
 
11.1 Completion of Outstanding Work and Remedying Defects 
In order that the Works and Contractor’s Documents, and each Section, 
shall be in the condition required by the Contractor (fair and wear and tear 
expected) by the expiry date of the relevant Defects Notification Period or 
as soon as practicable thereafter, the Contractor shall: 
(a) complete any work which is outstanding on the date stated in a Taking-
Over-Certificate, within such reasonable time as is instructed by the 
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Engineer, . . .  and 
(b) execute all work required to remedy defects or damage, as may be 
notified by (or on behalf of) the Employer on or before the expiry date of 
the Defects Notification Period for the Works or Section (as the case may 
be). 
 
It is contrary to the Lex Constructionis to allocate to the 
contractor the risk of what could happen to the work after its 
completion. The employer has plenty of time to warn during the 
"Defects Notification Period" of any defects or damages that the 
work presents, and to request the contractor to remedy them in the 
shortest possible time. 
This period of remedy –that is within the term of the 
contract– is so relevant here that the FIDIC Red Book includes an 
entire section of defects liability: 
 
11. DEFECTS LIABILITY 
11.1 Completion of Outstanding Work and Remedying Defects 
11.2 Cost of Remedying Defects 
11.3 Extension of Defects Notification Period 
11.4 Failure to Remedy Defects 
11.5 Removal of Defective Work 
11.6 Further Tests 
11.7 Right of Access 
11.8 Contractor to Search 
11.9 Performance Certificate 
11.10 Unfulfilled Obligations 
11.11 Clearance of Site  
 
Consequently, article 1785º is also contrary to international 
commercial practice because the contractor has no need to prove that 
the work was executed according to the rules of the art and in strict 
accordance with the instructions provided. It is enough to prove that 
the employer issued the “Performance Certificate.” 
It is also possible to name several examples with respect 
purchase-sale contracts. 
39
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D. Party that must assume the delivery and transportation costs 
 
Delivery and transportation costs 
Article 1530º.- The delivery costs are borne by the seller and the 




Article 1530º of the Peruvian Civil Code establishes which 
party assumes the delivery and transportation costs for all kind of 
purchase-sale contracts. 
This rule is contrary to the practice of international trade 
because the decision of which party should assume the delivery and 
transportation costs should never be established in a general way.  
The rules regarding which party assume the costs should vary 
depending on the sale contract that is executed.  There are so many 
types of sale contracts in the economy that the lawmakers cannot 
access the necessary context information (what is maximizing for 
parties that transacted in context X may not have been maximizing 
for parties that transacted in context Y).92 
When merchants execute contracts for the sale of goods at 
present, they use International Commercial Terms (“Incoterms”) to 
determine which party must assume these costs.  Since there are 
many types of contracts for the sale of goods, it is inconceivable for 
merchants to have a rule that establishes who assumes the costs in a 
general way. 
The Incoterms are a series of pre-defined commercial terms 
published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) that are 
intended primarily to communicate the costs and risks associated 
with the international transportation and delivery of goods. 
The Incoterms are accepted by governments, legal 
authorities, and practitioners worldwide for international trade, 
which implies that they are part of the Lex Mercatoria.  They seek 
to reduce or remove uncertainties with respect costs and risks. 
Incoterms 2010 defines 11 rules with the purpose of allocating costs 
to buyer/seller: (i) EXW – Ex Works (named place of delivery); (ii) 
FCA – Free Carrier (named place of delivery); (iii) CPT – Carriage 
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Paid To (named place of destination); (iv) CIP – Carriage and 
Insurance Paid to (named place of destination); (v) DAT – Delivered 
At Terminal (named terminal at port or place of destination); (vi) 
DAP – Delivered At Place (named place of destination); (vii) DDP 
– Delivered Duty Paid (named place of destination); (viii) FAS – 
Free Alongside Ship (named port of shipment); (x) FOB – Free on 
Board (named port of shipment); CFR – Cost and Freight (named 
port of destination); (xi) CIF – Cost, Insurance & Freight (named 
port of destination). 
After analyzing the practice of international trade through 
the Incoterms, it is hard not to see the absurdity of having a legislator 
that determines in a closed room—for all types of sales contracts—
which party is going assume the costs of delivery and transport. In 
my view, article 1530º of the Peruvian Civil Code is, as Hayek 
suggests, an example of fatal arrogance. 
E. Number of installments that must be failed 
 
Failure to pay installments 
Article 1561º.- When the price must be paid in several 
installments, if the buyer fails to pay three of them, successive or 
not, the seller can request the termination of the contract or 
demand from the debtor the immediate payment of the balance, 
giving due the installments that were pending. 
 
 
It is clear that there are many types of sale contracts and, 
therefore, it is also evident that there are sale contracts whose price 
is divided into different number of installments. Thus, there are sale 
contracts whose price must be paid in three installments and others 
that must be paid in 300.  Despite this, the Peruvian lawmaker has 
arrogantly determined that if the buyer fails to pay three 
installments, this amounts to a fundamental breach and, 
consequently, the seller is entitled to declare the avoidance of the 
contract.  If it is not relevant whether the contract price is divided 
into five or 500 installments, the legislator’s decision to divide it 
into three is entirely arbitrary to enable the seller to terminate the 
sale contract. 
I believe that article 1561º of the Peruvian Civil Code is an 
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arbitrary rule that lacks rationality.  The legislator is smart enough 
to determine in a general way how many installments must be 
missed before the seller can declare the avoidance of the contract, 
because nobody is that smart.  Sincerely, I do not think anyone is. 
What is more, I believe that no one should establish the 
number of installments that the buyer must fail in order to enable the 
seller to declare the avoidance of the contract.  Drafters would be 
required to create a menu of rules governing the termination of the 
sale contract, each of which would depend on the number of 
installments that the parties agreed.93 
In my view, the seller should be entitled to terminate an 
installment contract when the failure of the buyer constitutes a 
fundamental breach of the contract, which occurs if this breach 
results in such detriment to the seller as substantially to deprive him 
of what he is entitled to expect under the contract.  This not only 
depends on the number of installments that the contract has, but on 
many other variables. 
I believe that the most appropriate formula in a Civil Code 
is to create a general rule that establishes that the contract can be 
terminated if the failure to perform any obligation constitutes a 
fundamental breach of the contract.  It must be the arbitral tribunal 
who must determine, by virtue of many variables—not only the total 
number of installments—if the failure amounts to a fundamental 
breach of contract. 
For example, although it is inserted in the context of a 
specific sector, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) has opted for this path by 
legislating these rules with a general scope: 
 
Article 25 
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it 
results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him 
of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in 
breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the 
same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result (emphasis 
added). 
 
                                                            
93 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1528. 
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Article 64 
(1) The seller may declare the contract avoided:  
(a) if the failure by the buyer to perform any of his obligations under the 
contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract 
. . . (emphasis added). 
 
Article 73 
(1) In the case of a contract for delivery of goods by instalments, if the 
failure of one party to perform any of his obligations in respect of any 
instalment constitutes a fundamental breach of contract with respect to that 
instalment, the other party may declare the contract avoided with respect 
to that instalment. 
(2) If one party’s failure to perform any of his obligations in respect of 
any instalment gives the other party good grounds to conclude that a 
fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future 
instalments, he may declare the contract avoided for the future, provided 
that he does so within a reasonable time (emphasis added). 
. . .  
 
VIII. WHAT DEFAULT RULES SHOULD BE CREATED THROUGH THE 
LEX MERCATORIA AND WHAT DEFAULT RULES SHOULD BE 
CREATED BY THE STATE? 
 In some cases, it makes sense for the State to create default 
rules, but only in a minority of cases.  This is the case for rules that 
recognize the obligatory nature of contracts, the techniques of 
contractual interpretation, the grounds for nullity, the effects of 
contractual resolution, force majeure, hardship, and etcetera.94 
 However, if there are some default rules that should be 
created by the State and others through the Lex Mercatoria, where 
is the dividing line?  As mentioned above, default civil rules and 
default commercial rules must be differentiated.  Broadly speaking 
default civil rules are general while default commercial rules are 
                                                            
94 For instance, Schwartz and Scott, have affirmed that “[t]he default rule 
project could have responded to this constraint by only proposing transcontextual 
default rules. There are, however, just a few transcontextual default rules, and 
most of them had already emerged through the common law process. Here, the 
drafters wisely followed the common law; most of the transcontextual UCC and 
Restatement default rules were adopted from prior judicial creations.” Id. 
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sectoral.  When default rules are sectoral, they seek to distribute 
risks.  Those default rules should not be included in a Civil Code 
because it is a field that belongs, in the absence of the agreement of 
the parties, to the Lex Mercatoria.  The State, therefore, must not 
create default rules that belong to sectors such as construction, 
energy, hydrocarbons, merchandise, and sports. 
 On the contrary, when it comes to general default rules, the 
State must legislate them in a Civil Code for two reasons: (i) the 
universal acceptance of certain rules; and (ii) the necessity of 
counting with general institutions of private law in order to allocate 
risks efficiently. 
A. The universal acceptance of certain rules 
There are some rules that are so universal that it makes sense 
that they are legislated in a Civil Code.  What is more, some of them 
find their source in principles.  Thus, the obligatory nature of 
contracts finds its source in the principle pacta sunt servanda, the 
force majeure in the principle rebus sic stantibus, the exception of 
breach in the principle exceptio non adimpleti contractus, the 
prohibition of own acts in the principle venire factum proprium non-
valet, among many others. 
 In a study on the Lex Mercatoria prepared by the 
International Chamber of Commerce entitled “Developing Neutral 
Legal Standards for International Contracts: A-national rules as the 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Contracts” it was 
stated that there were a number of principles that have a vocation for 
universality, since they are present in all legal systems:  
 
- Parties are bound to respect the terms of the contract (pacta sunt 
servanda), unless there is a significant change of circumstances 
(rebus sic stantibus); 
- Parties must perform the contract in good faith. Parties may be liable 
for not respecting good faith during negotiations (culpa in 
contrahendo); 
- A contract obtained by bribes is void, or at least unenforceable; 
- A party can refuse to perform its obligations if the other has committed 
a substantial breach (inadiplenti non est adimplendum); 
- Damages for breach of contract are limited to the foreseeable 
consequences of the breach and include actual loss and loss of profit; 
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- A party which has suffered a breach of contract must take reasonable 
steps to mitigate the damage.95 
 
 On the other hand, a list of 130 general principles of the Lex 
Mercatoria, is published on ‘TransLex,’ (www.trans-lex.org) the 
online platform on transnational commercial law, operated by the 
Center for Transnational Law Cologne Law School.96 
 It is true that several of the rules that are based on these 
principles are mandatory, however, there are several that are not.  It 
is perfectly possible, for example, that the parties’ contract around 
the hardship clause or the force majeure clause.  They can also agree 
that certain type of damages will not be paid and that parties have 
no obligation to mitigate damages.  To the extent that many default 
rules find sustenance in principles, it makes absolute sense that it is 
the State that creates them. 
B. The necessity of counting with general institutions of private 
law in order to allocate risks efficiently 
With the purpose of providing legal certainty and reducing 
transactional costs, the general institutions of private law that the 
parties should use to allocate the risks of their contracts should be 
the same for everyone. 
 One party cannot have a notion of contract and another a 
different one; nor can divergences exist with respect to the definition 
of concepts such as obligation, term, condition, nullity, resolution, 
contractual interpretation, etcetera.  If so, everything would be 
chaotic.  Almost no transactions could be executed and it would be 
extremely costly for the courts to resolve disputes. 
 In fact, many of these rules simply define the institutions.  
Therefore, they provide parties with the tools through which they 
can decide how to allocate the risks of their contracts.  In this regard, 
the State must provide the ingredients and the parties must be free 
to decide how they want to mix them. 
                                                            
95 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: POLICY & BUS. PRACTICES, 
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The State, however, cannot infringe on party autonomy and 
decide instead of the parties how the risks of the contract should be 
allocated.  In short, the State should give the ingredients to the 
parties, but not prepare the cake for them.  The parties should 
prepare the cake using the ingredients provided by the State.  If the 
parties forget to regulate a certain issue in their contract, the answer 
must be found in the Lex Mercatoria. 
 The best example of how a Civil Code should be designed 
are the UNIDROIT Principles.97  If a thorough review of this text is 
carried out, it can be noticed that it basically contemplates general 
institutions.  The experts of UNIDROIT would never design rules 
that determine how risks should be allocated, for example, in a sale 
contract, in a lease contract or in a construction contract.  They know 
perfectly well that they do not have any legitimacy to determine how 
the risks in economic sectors should be allocated. 
 In my view, the UNIDROIT Principles are not part of the 
Lex Mercatoria.  This is the case because they contemplate, in 
essence, rules that could be perfectly included in a Civil Code.  The 
Lex Mercatoria has a dynamic and evolving character, and the 
UNIDROIT Principles do not.  The fact that the UNIDROIT 
Principles are codified in a normative text is the most reliable proof 
that it does not has a praxeological nature.  And, as I have explained, 
its praxeological nature is one of the essential distinctive features of 
the Lex Mercatoria. 
 In this regard, Professor De Jesús has stated that: 
 
In addition to the emergence of new contracts and their progressive 
standardization by the work of private professional organizations, a new 
source of transnational law has emerged in the past few decades that could 
potentially influence the transnational law of petroleum contracts: 
institutional codifications of contractual principles such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Lando 
                                                            
97 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT), is an intergovernmental organization based in Rome, Italy. Its 
objective is to study the needs and methods to modernize, harmonize and 
coordinate private law and commercial law, in particular among the States, as well 
as to formulate the instruments of uniform law, principles, and norms to achieve 
said objectives. Its main function is to harmonize private law among States. 
History and Overview, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/about-
unidroit/overview (last visited June 27, 2019). 
46https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/3
2019] THE FATAL LEVIATHAN 469 
Principles of European Contract Law. Both doctrinal codifications state 
that they may be used to govern transnational contracts when this has been 
agreed by the parties, when the parties have agreed their contract to be 
governed by general principles of law, the Lex Mercatoria or the like and 
also when the parties have not chosen any rules to govern their contracts. 
There has been a lot of debate regarding the nature of these codifications, 
as to whether they can be considered as a part of the Lex Mercatoria or 
as a new expression of the Lex Mercatoria. Although we believe that these 
codifications are extremely useful (and we recognize their role as an 
exceptional source of transnational rules) we don’t systematically 
recognize them as being part of the Lex Mercatoria, the Lex Petrolea or 
any other transnational legal order. Only the rules of these codifications 
that really satisfy the needs and interests of a particular transnational 
industry will be considered as part of its transnational legal order. The 
process of incorporation of the rules of these codifications, or at least some 
of them, into the Lex Mercatoria, the Lex Petrolea or any other legal order 
depends exclusively on the choice of their members. A choice that can be 
ascertained by industry practices, by agreement of the parties to 
transnational contracts or, alternatively, by the application of these rules 
by arbitral tribunals.98  
 
 The Lex Mercatoria is composed by praxeological default rules 
that are formed spontaneously in every single economic sector. 
Thus, Lex Mercatoria is a product of repetition; not of a decision. 
When a group of experts meets to decide what should be the general 
rules applicable to contracts, we are clearly facing a constructivist 
process.  The Lex Mercatoria is by definition an enemy of 
constructivism, which means that the UNIDROIT Principles are 
simply a model law. 
 Arguing that the UNIDROIT Principles are part of the Lex 
Mercatoria because in its preamble it is established that “[t]hey may 
be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be 
governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the 
like”99 is a very unpersuasive argument.  The essence of things lies 
in their nature, not in the preamble of a normative text. 
 
 
                                                            
98 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 24–25 (emphasis added). 
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IX. ARBITRAL AWARDS ARE THE SOURCE PAR EXCELLENCE OF LEX 
MERCATORIA IN THE PERUVIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
The sources par excellence of Lex Mercatoria in 
international commercial relations are the following: (i) the new 
contracts and clauses that have emerged from the evolution of 
transnational contracts, (ii) the standardization and 
institutionalization of some of those contracts and clauses by the 
practice and the works of professional associations; (iii) the 
publication of doctrinal codifications of rules potentially applicable 
to contracts and (iv) the arbitral awards.100 
Although Lex Mercatoria has different sources, I believe 
that the most important one in the Peruvian legal system are arbitral 
awards.  The reason is very simple: Arbitral awards are the only 
source that has answers to contingencies not foreseen in the 
contracts executed by the parties. 
When the parties are not sophisticated merchants, it makes 
sense for arbitrators to use modern contract clauses or new 
standardized contracts as Lex Mercatoria to resolve disputes.  
Nevertheless, when the parties are sophisticated merchants, the 
sources mentioned above are irrelevant because the contracts 
entered into by the parties are usually very advanced and in most of 
the cases already include all the contingencies foreseen in modern 
clauses or in new standardized contracts. 
By contrast, arbitral awards decide on situations that parties 
usually have not anticipated in their contracts.  As these decisions 
have a very clear economic rationality, they have substantial 
legitimacy and are usually followed by other arbitral tribunals in 
future disputes.  Faced with the reiteration of awards in a certain 
direction, the parties begin to anticipate this risk in their contracts 
and specialists begin to include them in standardized contracts. As a 
result, Lex Mercatoria spontaneously develops. 
In this regard, I believe that arbitral awards are the key 
source driving the evolution of the Lex Mercatoria.  This is the only 
source in which answers to unforeseen contingencies can be found 
when the parties are sophisticated merchants.  New contractual 
trends and standardized contracts are sources that have usually been 
                                                            
100 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 23. 
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taken into account by the parties when concluding the contract. 
It might be possible to argue that the same function could be 
fulfilled by courts because judges also have the possibility to rule on 
contingencies not foreseen in the contract. In the following sections, 
I will demonstrate that, while that might be true with respect to 
common law judges, civil law judges create commercial in a very 
limited way.  In addition, I will demonstrate that, unlike civil law 
judges, arbitrators continually create commercial law through their 
arbitral awards. 
 
a) Courts do not create commercial law through their judgments 
 
Some scholars have argued that a court system (public or 
private) provides two types of service:  The first is dispute 
resolution, i.e., determining whether a rule has been violated, the 
second is rule formulation, i.e., creating rules of law as a by-product 
of the dispute settlement process.  In this regard, it is argued that 
when a court resolves a dispute, its resolution, especially if 
embodied in a written opinion, provides information regarding the 
likely outcome of similar disputes in the future.101 
According to this line of thought, courts fulfill two functions: 
A jurisdictional function and a legislative function.  Courts fulfill a 
jurisdictional function when they resolve disputes, but they also 
perform a legislative function when they create law through their 
judgments. 
 
Along these lines, Posner and Landes have argued that: 
 
A court system (public or private) produces two types of service. One is 
dispute resolution––determining whether a rule has been violated. The 
other is rule formation––creating rules of law as a by-product of the 
dispute-settlement process. When a court resolves a dispute, its resolution, 
especially if embodied in a written opinion, provides information 
regarding the likely outcome of similar disputes in the future. This is the 
system of precedent, which is so important in the Anglo-American legal 
                                                            
101 Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Adjudication as a Private 
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979). 
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system.102 
 
Posner and Landes argue that the creation of law is a public 
good because, when judges resolve disputes, this service is 
consumed by the society as a whole.  Thus, they affirm that 
predictability and the creation of law are public goods because they 
create a climate of institutional trust that promotes investment, 
expedites dispute resolution, and reduces transaction costs.  These 
benefits do not have rivalry in their consumption. 
In the Peruvian legal system (and in civil law countries in 
general), however, the only body that has the obligation to create 
law and predictability is the Supreme Court.  It is true that courts, 
for example, can not deviate from the precedents created by the 
Supreme Court; however, creating law is not one of their functions. 
And in the hypothetical scenario in which it was one of their 
functions, the externalities they would create would be much more 
negative than positive, because by continually rendering 




                                                            
102 Id. Similarly, Silberman has stated that “[s]ome critics, however, have 
raised a more fundamental challenge to ADR. They have argued that ADR 
subverts one of the basic purposes of adjudication—the public resolution of 
disputes and the public articulation of legal norms. For these critics, the resolution 
of disputes in a public forum, resulting in the making of law, is not just an 
incidental feature of adjudication, but one of its principal purposes. On this view, 
delegating the dispute resolution process to a privatize organization always comes 
at a cost, no matter how efficient or accurate the result.” LINDA SILBERMAN ET 
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, THEORY AND PRACTICE 1190 (5th ed. 2017) (emphasis 
omitted). Finally, Cuniberti has stated that “[a]nother public function of 
adjudication is to make the law accessible to the public. Public access to 
adjudication enables the public to learn about the law and about procedures. 
Public trials and published judgments teach the public that there are rules, and that 
such rules are enforced. This knowledge increases the awareness of the public of 
their rights, and thus results more often in the vindication of those rights. The 
actual reach of the legal system is extended. Moreover, as the state is able to 
clearly show that it uses its power in accordance with procedures and rules, it 
reinforces the legitimacy of such power.” Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract – The 
Case for Default Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes, 40 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 417, 463 (2008).  
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As explained by Correa: 
 
Civil and commercial justice is now financed by general revenues, in 
terms of the cost of running the courts, in circumstances that not only do 
not constitute a public good, but also that the externalities that could 
eventually be generated are, in fact, very limited.103  
 
The Peruvian legal system is far removed from the common 
law systems in which courts create commercial law continually. 
This being so, it is nonsense to argue that by resolving commercial 
disputes civil law judges provide a public good in the legal system.  
In fact, it sounds like a joke in poor taste to use this argument when 
Peruvian courts contradict each other every day.  The lack of 
predictability is the daily bread of the Peruvian legal system. 
 
b) Arbitrators continually create commercial law through their 
arbitral awards 
 
Unlike judges, arbitrators create commercial law through 
their arbitral awards all the time. Many specialists even suggest that 
arbitrators create precedents, and as we will see, their arguments are 
very strong. 
 
In this regard, Professor Weidemaier has stated that: 
 
Do arbitrators create precedent? The claim that they do not recurs 
throughout the arbitration literature. Yet this claim conflicts with a small 
but growing body of evidence that, in some arbitration systems, arbitrators 
frequently cite to other arbitrators, claim to rely on past awards, and 
promote adjudicatory consistency as an important system goal. Thus, 
although not every system of arbitration generates precedent, some clearly 
do.104 
 
At least in the Peruvian legal system, arbitrators are more 
                                                            
103 Jorge Correa S. et al., Poder Judicial y Mercado: ¿Quién Debe Pagar 
por la Justicia? [Judicial Power and Market: Who Should Pay for Justice] 2 
INFORMES DE INVESTIGACIÓN [RES. REP.] 29, 35 (1999) (trans. by Fabio Núñez 
del Prado Ch.). 
104 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in 
Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1895, 1899 (2010). 
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likely to create commercial law than are judges.  For a common law 
lawyer, it might be difficult to believe that arbitrators create more 
commercial law than do judges through their arbitral awards.  While 
arbitrators do not create commercial law in the same way as 
common law judges, they have proven to be the producers par 
excellence of Lex Mercatoria. 
In effect, when a contingency has not been foreseen in the 
contract, the arbitrators decide which of the parties should assume 
this risk.  Since the arbitrators are experts in the economic sector in 
which the controversy unfolds, their decision is not only 
automatically respected by the parties, but is also repeated by other 
arbitrators in future disputes.  Then, the parties begin to incorporate 
this contingency in their contract to have a clear agreement and, in 
this way, the Lex Mercatoria is formed spontaneously. 
What is more, to the extent that regardless of the country, the 
distribution of contractual risks tends to be virtually the same, 
domestic arbitral awards are not the only ones that arbitrators can 
apply as Lex Mercatoria for the resolution of commercial disputes; 
they can apply international arbitral awards as well. 
In the oil sector, for example, the Lex Petrolea has developed 
over time and can be found in various arbitral awards: the Abu 
Dhabi award of 1951, the Qatar award of 1953, the Aramco award 
of 1953, the Saphire award against Iran of 1963 and the three awards 
against Libya, the BP award of 1973, the Texaco award of 1977 and 
the Liamco award of 1977.105 It is precisely these arbitral awards 
that have created the transnational oil rules. 
In this regard, Professor De Jesús has stated that: 
 
It follows that arbitral jurisprudence is another crucial source of rules for 
the transnational petroleum industry. Formerly, the paradigm maintained 
that international arbitration was confidential but the reality embodied in 
new trends points towards transparency (particularly in investment treaty 
cases) and the impact of the communication technologies in this hyper-
connected world demonstrates that arbitral awards, even awards that are 
supposed to remain confidential, are easily accessible in the petroleum 
society. These arbitral awards or relevant extracts are also published in 
law reviews of some of the foremost arbitral institutions like the ICC 
International Arbitration Court Bulletin, the ICSID Review – Foreign 
                                                            
105 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 25. 
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Investment Law Journal, as well as the Journal de droit international 
(Clunet). In general, most arbitral awards can be construed as a source of 
inspiration for the transnational petroleum industry, but without any doubt 
the arbitral awards rendered in the field of petroleum resources constitute 
a privileged source of the Lex Petrolea. In recent years, a number of papers 
have been published concerning arbitral jurisprudence related to the 
petroleum industry, some analyzing the different phases of its evolution, 
others identifying and categorizing the issues decided in these awards.106 
 
Additionally, arbitrators create much more commercial law 
than judges, particularly because the latter have almost no 
opportunity to decide on commercial disputes.  In Peru, nearly all 
commercial disputes are resolved through arbitration. In the words 
of Bullard: 
 
Today in Peru it is difficult to imagine conflicts of important commercial 
contracts that are solved in the judiciary. Virtually everything is resolved 
through arbitration.107 
 
Finally, arbitrators have much more legitimacy when 
creating commercial law than judges, because unlike them, they are 
specialized in the economic sectors in which commercial disputes 
are usually inserted.  Thus, to the extent that the parties are entitled 
to choose their arbitrators, the latter are always experts in matters of 
conflict. Indeed, if a party has an energy dispute, it will designate an 
energy expert as an arbitrator.  If a party has a construction dispute, 
it will designate a construction expert as an arbitrator.  Many parties 
even appoint engineers as their arbitrators in construction disputes 
or economists for their energy disputes.  These people are in the best 
position to identify the applicable uses and customs or, in any case, 
to determine which of the two parties should assume a certain risk.  
The arbitrators understand the economic sector of the dispute very 
well, so their decisions not only have legitimacy before the parties, 
but before society as a whole. 
Arbitrators, consequently, continually create Lex Mercatoria 
through their arbitral awards.  The Lex Petrolea, for example, has 
been created largely through arbitral awards. The same happens with 
                                                            
106 Id. at 25–26. 
107 Bullard González, supra note 65, at 86 (trans. by Fabio Núñez del 
Prado Ch.). 
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the Lex Constructionis.  It is the decisions of the arbitrators that 
determine whether the risks of a certain economic sector are 
allocated to one side of the table or the other.  Not in vain is it often 
said that international arbitrators are the natural judges of the Lex 
Mercatoria.108 
 
Along these lines, Professor De Jesús has argued that: 
 
It follows that arbitral jurisprudence is another crucial source of rules for 
the transnational petroleum industry. Formerly, the paradigm maintained 
that international arbitration was confidential but the reality embodied in 
new trends points towards transparency (particularly in investment treaty 
cases) and the impact of the communication technologies in this hyper-
connected world demonstrates that arbitral awards, even awards that are 
supposed to remain confidential, are easily accessible in the petroleum 
society. These arbitral awards or relevant extracts are also published in 
law reviews of some of the foremost arbitral institutions like the ICC 
International Arbitration Court Bulletin, the ICSID Review – Foreign 
Investment Law Journal, as well as the Journal de droit international 
(Clunet).109 
 
Unlike arbitrators, courts are not well placed to create Lex 
Mercatoria because they do not have the ability to identify which is 
the applicable transnational rule, and because they lack the technical 
or specialized knowledge to do so.  Among other reasons, this 
explains why in Peru there is an absolute distrust in the courts. 
It is also argued by many scholars that arbitration is not a 
predictable system.  At least in Peru, arbitrators are much more 
predictable than judges.  As Bullard explains below, predictability 
in arbitration is not created from the top by a higher centralized 
body, but from below, by means of the decisions of arbitrants in the 
market.110  To the extent that arbitrators are paid by the parties, they 
have all the incentives to create predictable rules.  Doing so ensures 
                                                            
108 Alfredo De Jesús O., La Autonomía del Arbitraje Comercial 
Internacional a la Hora de la Constitucionalización del Arbitraje en América 
Latina [The Autonomy of International Commercial Arbitration at the Time of 
Constitutionalization of Arbitration in Latin America] 3 LIMA ARB. 151, 167 
(2008). 
109 De Jesús O., supra note 57, at 26. 
110 Bullard González, supra note 65, at 79 (trans. by Fabio Núñez del 
Prado Ch.). 
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them work in the future.111  This explains why arbitrators tend to 
create uniform rules spontaneously.112 
                                                            
111 In that sense, Cuniberti has stated that “ADR critics further argue that, 
even if access to arbitral awards was easy, it would not bring much, as arbitrators 
have neither the willingness, nor the ability to develop precedents. First, 
arbitrators would have no incentives to develop rules, as they would not be paid 
to perform this function, but solely to resolve disputes. Second, they would not 
have the appropriate training anyway. Finally, and in any case, even if they would 
and could, arbitration is too decentralized to offer the possibility to develop a 
consistent and precise body of rules. The two first arguments are contradicted by 
the reality of modern international commercial arbitration. It is true that the vast 
majority of international arbitration regimes do not require that arbitrators have 
legal training. It is also true that the service that the parties seek is the settlement 
of their private dispute. However, in practice, most international arbitrators are 
distinguished jurists. They are either experienced legal practitioners, or law 
professors. Their legal expertise and prestige is often very high. If one accepts 
that judges are not superheroes for the sole reason that they went through the 
appointing process of their country of origin, there is no reason to consider that 
arbitrators could not have the training and the skills to develop the law if they 
wanted to. However, would they be willing to do so? Again, the practice of 
international commercial arbitration is that they most often are, so much so that 
they are commonly urged not to forget that their main task is not to develop the 
law and to write legal dissertations, but to settle the dispute appropriately. At first 
sight, this may seem surprising. Arbitrators do not seem to need to engage into a 
difficult activity without being paid for it, and parties certainly do not have any 
reason to pay for an activity which will essentially benefit others, that is future 
litigants. How can this seemingly inefficient conduct be explained, then? Quite 
simply, by the need for arbitrators to show their skills. They do not necessarily 
wish to market themselves aggressively so as to be appointed in future 
arbitrations, but they certainly have a professional reputation that they wish to 
maintain, or to enhance. Additionally, it should be underlined that many 
international arbitrators, especially in the civil law world, are law professors. They 
thus have an inclination towards legal analysis, and may wish to use the arbitration 
as just another forum.” Cuniberti, supra note 102, at 456–57. 
112 As we have pointed out, in the system we propose, the risk of 
contradictory awards is eliminated. And if it were true that this risk continues to 
exist, a competitive system is spontaneously created in which the best awards are 
those that prevail. The bad ones are automatically discarded from the system. In 
this regard, Cuniberti has stated that “[i]n the last decade, the practice of 
international arbitration has offered evidence that arbitral tribunals can develop 
precedents. In several specialized fields, arbitral tribunals cite, examine and 
follow decisions made by prior tribunals. Some of the common features of these 
specialized arbitrations explain why this has been possible. First, most of the 
awards made by these tribunals are public. They are typically available on line 
shortly after being made, and are also published in legal journals. Second, the 
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To again quote Bullard: 
 
Would the arbitrators still have incentives to generate good rules for others 
that will not pay them? The answer is affirmative. To deny it is to lose 
perspective that, as usually happens in the market, arbitration is a repeated 
game, in which the possibility of selling my services tomorrow depends 
on how I lent my services yesterday. The arbitrators, like any other person 
who sells something, want to continue selling their services in the future. 
Therefore, being recognized as the generator of a public asset ensures 
them work in the future.113 
 
Moreover, if arbitral awards and judgments are analyzed, it 
would be very easy to realize that arbitrators cite other awards more 
frequently than courts cite other judgments.  When parties prepare 
writs, most of the parties' arguments are supported by arbitral 
awards in previous cases.  Parties do not cite arbitral awards without 
reason; they cite them because arbitral tribunals pay significant 
attention to what other arbitrators have decided in previous cases. 
As Professor Kaufmann-Kohler has stated: It may be 
debatable whether arbitrators have a legal obligation to follow 
precedents—probably not—but it seems well settled that they have 
a moral obligation to follow precedents so as to foster a normative 
environment that is predictable. 
Some might claim that arbitral awards cannot be one of Lex 
                                                            
awards provide a detailed analysis of legal issues. In one particular field, foreign 
investment law, they commonly reach a hundred pages. Third, the vast majority 
of the arbitrators sitting in the tribunals are experienced legal academics or 
practitioners, and sometimes indeed very distinguished jurists. On these three 
accounts, these arbitral tribunals are not significantly less equipped than courts to 
make the law and develop precedents. Of course, if these tribunals had been 
unwilling and unable to develop precedents, they would not have done so. Yet 
they have.” Id. 458–59. 
113 “[T]he same does not happen with ordinary judges. The number of 
cases, the volume of work and the level of income of a judge is not related to a 
repeated game or to the amount of work. The parties are subject to certain judges 
by a centralized and planned shift system that assigns work only because it is your 
turn. What incentive does a judge have in creating good and predictable rules? In 
principle none. The game will continue to be equally repetitive regardless of 
whether it solves well or solves badly, and what is worse, will continue to charge 
the same.” Bullard González, supra note 65, at 79–80 (trans. by Fabio Núñez del 
Prado Ch.). 
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Mercatoria's sources par excellence in the Peruvian legal system 
because, due to the principle of confidentiality, awards are not 
accessible to the public.  While I disagree with this principle (for 
reasons I will explained later), it has been diminishing in 
significance in the Peruvian legal system. 
For example, the website of the arbitral institution of the 
State Procurement Supervisory Body (“OSCE”)—one of the many 
existing Peruvian arbitral institutions—stores more than 1800 
arbitral awards in its bank of awards despite the fact that the 
institution was created in 2011.114  
Additionally, with respect labor matters, under article 60 of 
the Regulations of the Collective Labor Relations Act, it has been 
established that the Labor Directorate must centralize arbitral 
awards and must publish them on the website of the Ministry of 
Labor. Again, arbitral awards are accessible to the public. 
On the other hand, the International Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC Court”)—which 
administers several arbitrations in Peru—does not establish an 
obligation of confidentiality in its arbitral rules.  Moreover, every 
certain period of years the ICC publishes a book called Collection 
of ICC Arbitral Awards that contains extracts of arbitral awards that 
were rendered in the framework of an ICC arbitration.  This measure 
adopted by the ICC since 1974 has been, to a large extent, the 
accelerator that has allowed the development of Lex Mercatoria 
worldwide in many economic sectors.115 
Although the publication of these books has had a very 
significant relevance for the development of commercial law, this 
year the ICC has adopted one of the most revolutionary measures in 
the history of arbitration, and which, against all odds, reinforces my 
proposal. 
                                                            
114 It is possible to access the OSCE here: 
http://prodapp1.osce.gob.pe/sda-
pub/documentos/public/busquedaArbitraje.xhtml (last visited Aug. 26, 2019). 
115 There are seven books that contain extracts of arbitral awards from 
the last 45 years: Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974–1985, Collection of 
ICC Arbitral Awards 1986–1990, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1991–1995, 
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1996–2000, Collection of ICC Arbitral 
Awards 2001–2007, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 2008–2011, Collection 
of ICC Arbitral Awards 2012–2015, and the last one is forthcoming.  
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Indeed, on January 1, 2019, the ICC Court issued a Note to 
Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration 
under the ICC Rules of Arbitration changing the paradigm of 
confidentiality: 
 
D - Publication of Awards  
40. Publicising and disseminating information about arbitration has been 
one of ICC’s commitments since its creation and an instrumental factor in 
facilitating the development of trade worldwide.  
41. Parties and arbitrators in ICC arbitrations accept that ICC awards made 
as from 1 January 2019 may be published according to the following 
provisions. 
42. The Secretariat will inform the parties and arbitrators, at the time of 
notification of any final award made as from 1 January 2019, that such 
final award, as well as any other award and dissenting or concurring 
opinion made in the case, may be published in its entirety no less than two 
years after the date of said notification. The parties may agree to a longer 
or shorter time period for publication. 
43. At any time before publication, any party may object to publication or 
require that any award be in all or part anonymized or pseudonymized, in 
which case the award will not be published or will be anonymized or 
pseudonymized. 
44. In case of a confidentiality agreement covering certain aspects of the 
arbitration or of the award, publication will be subject to the parties’ 
specific consent. 
45. The Secretariat may anonymize or pseudonymize personal data 
included in the award as necessary pursuant to the applicable data 
protection regulations.  
46. The Secretariat may always, in its discretion, exempt awards from 
publication. 116 
 
 The ICC Court is altering the rule that prevailed with respect 
the confidentiality. Instead of being an opt-out, confidentiality will 
be opt-in, which implies that the rule would be the publication of the 
arbitral award. This measure will certainly make ICC arbitral 
                                                            
116 INT’L COURT OF ARBITRATION, NOTE TO PARTIES AND ARBITRAL 
TRIBUNALS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATION UNDER THE ICC RULES OF 
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jurisprudence more accessible and should be a boon to arbitration 
counsel. 
In my view, this change of paradigm will not only promote 
transparency in arbitration, but will have an immense impact on the 
evolution of Lex Mercatoria.  This is even recognized by the ICC 
itself, which begins its note affirming that “[p]ublicizing and 
disseminating information about arbitration has been one of ICC’s 
commitments since its creation and an instrumental factor in 
facilitating the development of trade worldwide.”117 
It would be for best if this initiative will be imitated by other 
arbitral institutions sooner rather than later.  This is the type of 
measures that must be adopted by the Peruvian arbitral institutions 
in order to make arbitral awards more accessible, and thus promote 
the evolution of the Lex Mercatoria. 
X. CONCLUSION 
 In my view, if a contingency arises that is not foreseen in the 
text of the contract, and it is not clear which of the parties must 
assume the risk, then the answer must be found in the Lex 
Mercatoria.  It is the only source that can provide an effective 
solution to the situation and, to the extent that it is based on 
commercial practices, it has much more legitimacy for international 
trade operators. 
 If disputes were resolved according to the rules of a Civil 
Code or another State-rule, there is a risk that the solutions provided 
by the legislator will be absolutely arbitrary and will not find 
sustenance in trade practices.  When this happens and the parties do 
not understand the rationality of the rule and the reason for a certain 
decision, the legal system loses legitimacy. 
 It could be argued that it is indispensable that the State has 
the responsibility to create default rules because, otherwise, there 
would be an absolute legal uncertainty in which the arbitrators 
would not have a clear notion of what default rule they should apply 
when they have to resolve a dispute.  This argument is unfounded. 
 The best proof of this is that some contracts such as energy 
contracts or financing contracts are not regulated in the Civil Code.  
Therefore, there are no default commercial rules to apply, and even 
                                                            
117 Id. para. 40 (emphasis added). 
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so arbitrators have never had any problems resolving the 
controversies that arise out from them. 
 Curiously, the absence of default commercial rules in certain 
types of contracts in the Peruvian Civil Code is very efficient 
because parties have strong incentives to regulate all the imaginable 
contractual terms.  They want to be sure that all risks are 
appropriately allocated in the contract.  During the negotiations, 
they invest a lot of time thinking about all the contingencies that 
could arise in the future.118  This may seem inefficient at the 
beginning, but once the commercial practices are standardized, Lex 
Mercatoria is formed, and the result is extremely efficient for three 
reasons: 
(i) Merchants start using very detailed model contracts that 
are basically the result of developed commercial 
practices.  This allows parties to save significant 
negotiation costs.  In any case, if for any reason the 
model contract includes a specific provision that parties 
do not like, they just need to opt out of it; 
(ii) Trade practice starts to spread out between countries.  
Merchants, judges, and arbitrators know them very well.  
This saves important litigation costs.  Since everyone 
knows which party, under a particular situation, should 
assume a particular risk, merchants are disincentivized 
of initiating disputes they know they are going to lose; 
(iii) In a specific case in which the parties forget to use a 
model contract and, therefore, their contract is full of 
gaps, Lex Mercatoria provides effective responses to all 
the contingencies not foreseen in the contract.  This gap-
filling mechanism also saves significant costs. 
 
 The absence of default rules and the correlative application 
of the Lex Mercatoria to these controversies generates another 
important positive externality. 
                                                            
118 It is very usual, therefore, that the contract has already determined 
which of the parties will assume the risk of a certain contingency. In fact, if one 
revises the model clauses of commercial contracts such as stock purchase 
agreements, energy contracts, or financing contracts, it is easy to realize that 
parties are extremely thorough when they negotiate such clauses. And to the 
extent that new unforeseen situations always arises in reality, the model clauses 
are constantly optimized. 
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 To the extent that one of the main sources of the Lex 
Mercatoria is the standard contractual clauses, the fact that the 
parties allocate the risks in one way or the other allows Lex 
Mercatoria to develop.119 
 Thus, these new contracts allow the Lex Mercatoria to adapt 
more effectively to the needs and expectations of merchants.  Thus, 
when the State does not allocate the risks of the contracts, default 
rules are created spontaneously. 
In the words of Trakman: “The only law which could 
effectively enhance the activities of merchants under these 
conditions would be suppletive law, i.e., law which recognized the 
capacity of merchants to regulate their own affairs through their 
customs, their usages, and their practices.”120 
 In this scenario, the resolution of disputes also plays an 
essential role for the development of the Lex Mercatoria because the 
awards and judgments serve to make the rules more precise and even 
create new rules that meet the expectations of merchants.  As 
pointed out by Benson: 
 
Dispute resolution can be a very important source of changes in laws, 
because a judge will often have to make more precise the rules on which 
there are differences of opinion and even provide new rules, because those 
of generalized use do not adjust to the new situation. The new rule 
becomes part of the order if the relevant group accepts it, and not because 
it is coercively imposed by some authority that backs the court. In this 
way, good rules that facilitate interaction tend to remain by selection over 
time, while bad judgments are ignored.121 
 
 In the same sense, Professor Epstein has stated that: 
 
It remains to discover the terms of given contracts, usually gathered from 
language itself, and the circumstances of its formation and performance. 
Even with these aids, many contractual gaps will remain, and the [private 
                                                            
119 In my view, the arbitrary default commercial rules that are found in 
the Civil Code or in other special state-law constitute the worst obstacles for 
commercial law to adapt to the new needs and expectations of merchants. 
120 Leon E. Trakman, The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our 
Commercial Heritage - Part I: Ancient and Medieval Law Merchant, 12 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 1, 5 (1980). 
121 BENSON, supra note 67, at 24. 
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or public] courts will be obliged, especially with partially executed 
contracts, to fashion the terms which the parties have not fashioned 
themselves. To fill the gaps, the courts have looked often to the custom or 
industry practice. The judicial practice makes good sense, and for our 
purposes introduces an element of dynamism into the system.122 
 
 For all the above reasons, I conclude that legislative creation 
of default commercial rules, in the first place, diminishes the 
incentives of the parties to regulate exhaustively their contracts; and, 
if this were not enough, limits and stagnates the development of the 
Lex Mercatoria. 
XI. PROPOSALS 
I believe that there are three measures that must be adopted 
immediately in the Peruvian legal system to accelerate the evolution 
of Lex Mercatoria and thus ensure that the resolution of commercial 
disputes always find sustenance in commercial law: (i) Repeal 
several articles of the Peruvian Civil Code; (ii) Eliminate the 
principle of confidentiality in arbitration; and (iii) Recognize 
arbitration as the default jurisdiction for commercial disputes. 
 
A.  First Proposal: Repeal Several Articles of the Civil 
Peruvian Code  
 
If the legislative creation of default commercial rules 
diminishes the incentives of the parties to regulate exhaustively their 
contracts, and limits and stagnates the development of the Lex 
Mercatoria, all the default commercial rules of the Peruvian Civil 
Code must be repealed. As suggested earlier, the legislator has to let 
the Lex Mercatoria do its job. 
To the extent that the Peruvian Civil Code contains several 
types of contracts, I will focus only on the provisions of the sale 
contract (which applies to hundreds of contracts today) and the 
provisions of the work contract (which apply to construction 
contracts). 
Therefore, below, in Figure 1, I propose to repeal the 
                                                            
122 Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 253, 266 (1980). 
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following default sale rules and default construction rules of the 
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These are just some of the default commercial rules that must 
be repealed.  There are, however, hundreds of other default 
commercial rules of other types of contracts that must be repealed. 
In addition, there are many mandatory rules that are absolutely 
paternalistic that must also be repealed, however, that is not part of 
the subject of this paper. 
 
B. Second Proposal: Eliminate the Principle of Confidentiality 
in Arbitration 
 
If we know that arbitral awards are the source par excellence 
of the Lex Mercatoria in the Peruvian Legal System, it is urgent to 
adopt measures that ensure that arbitral awards are increasingly 
publicized in the Peruvian legal system. 
Given that arbitrators also perform a legislative function 
(through the creation of commercial law) that is consumed by the 
society as a whole and, consequently, also fulfill a public function, 
the principle of confidentiality in arbitration must be eliminated. 
This would enable the availability of arbitral awards and, 
consequently, would facilitate the evolution of Lex Mercatoria in 
the Peruvian legal system. 
 
In this regard, Cuniberti has stated that: 
 
Traditionally, confidentially has been presented as one of the principal 
advantages of arbitration . . . As far as the publication of awards is 
concerned, recent developments in certain specialized fields of arbitration 
have shown that confidentiality has now become the exception rather than 
the norm. It is not in the very nature of arbitration to be confidential.  
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494 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:2 
In the proposed model, none of the actors of the arbitral process would 
have a duty to observe confidentiality . . . As the proposed model would 
potentially decrease the number of international commercial cases decided 
by courts, it would be important to make available the decisions of the 
arbitrators. In principle, thus, awards could be made public.123 
 
If commercial justice were a purely private good, it would 
be absurd to propose that arbitral awards be accessible to the public. 
However, to the extent that arbitrators create commercial law 
through their arbitral awards that are publicly consumed, it is 
undeniable that commercial justice also exhibits some 
characteristics of a public good. Consequently, it is perfectly 
reasonable to insist on the mandatory publication of arbitral awards. 
This is an indispensable measure that must be taken to eliminate any 
obstacle to the development of Lex Mercatoria. 
Thus, in the system I propose, insofar as commercial justice 
is predominantly a private good, arbitration proceedings would 
remain confidential. Nevertheless, to the extent that arbitrators act 
as operators of commerce and, therefore, create commercial law 
through their arbitral awards, the publication of arbitral awards in a 
database will be mandatory, so the society will be able to enjoy this 
public good. The rule, then, should be the publicity of the decisions. 
As Cuniberti suggests, “[m]y sense is that it does not, and that what 
really matters is the availability of decisions.”124 
In this model, the parties to the arbitration will be free to 
cross out those sections of the arbitral award containing extremely 
sensitive information. However, in no case will they be able to cross 
out those parts in which the arbitrators are ruling with respect to 
commercial law. 
Other interesting proposals have been offered. Professor 
Weidemaier, for example, argues that the publication of arbitral 
awards is not strictly necessary; he affirms that the accessibility to 
such awards is sufficient. In that sense, Weidemaier has suggested 
that: 
 
Of course, no system of precedent is likely to arise unless arbitrators 
become aware of relevant past awards, either through their own research 
                                                            
123 Cuniberti, supra note 102, at 465. 
124 Id. 
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or, more commonly, because the litigants cite past awards as authority. 
This explains the arbitration literature’s emphasis on the importance of 
award publication. The practice of publishing awards—often in searchable 
form— significantly reduces the cost to litigants of such research, making 
it feasible even in relatively low-stakes disputes.  
… 
Repeat player litigants and law firms likewise accumulate knowledge of 
prior disputes and may invoke past awards that favor their current 
positions.125 
 
Under Weidemaier’s proposal, arbitration consumers—
arbitrants—may consider previous awards, even in the absence of 
publication. Each of the arbitrators will have the obligation to 
publish their arbitral awards in this platform, which must be 
available to everyone. The arbitrators may redact the names of 
parties in the award and any other sensitive information. However, 
the publication of the reasoning of the arbitral award must be 
mandatory. In my view, this would enhance the development of 
commercial law. 
This measure will also generate a positive externality, 
because transparency with respect how disputes are resolved 
constitutes an authentic guarantee of democracy. Citizens will be 
able to monitor and supervise the workings of arbitrators.  
 In arbitration, parties bestow jurisdiction to the arbitrators, 
                                                            
125 Weidemaier, supra note 104, at 1920–21. Professor Weidemaier has 
also stated that “the focus on award publication may be misguided. One benefit 
of publication is that published awards are accessible to third parties with limited 
(or no) familiarity with the system. For example, because awards issued pursuant 
to the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) employment rules are available 
in searchable form on LexisNexis, a lawyer who has not previously arbitrated a 
case before a AAA arbitrator, but who has access to LexisNexis, can quickly 
search for relevant past awards, including those issued by prospective arbitrators. 
Without publication, such relative outsiders are unlikely to locate relevant awards. 
For reasons that should be fairly obvious, this does not mean that arbitral 
precedent depends on award publication. What matters is that system participants 
have access to past awards and assign value to them as precedent. Even when 
awards are not published, for example, arbitrators are often repeat players and 
may be well aware of how they and other arbitrators have resolved similar 
disputes. This suggests that arbitral precedent may evolve more readily in systems 
in which relatively few arbitrators capture a large share of the arbitration 
business.” Id. at 1921. 
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granting them the power to resolve disputes with res judicata effects. 
And I believe that any delegated power must have some system of 
control. As Reisman points out, with controls it remains a delegated 
and restricted power. Without controls it becomes absolute. Hence 
the linkage between controls, limited power, and liberty.126 
 
C.  Third Proposal: Recognize Arbitration as the Default 
Jurisdiction for Commercial Disputes 
 
In common law, many authors have argued that, as a general 
rule, default rules should be based on majority preference.127 In this 
regard, Professors Ayres and Gertner have stated that: 
                                                            
126 Id. at 1898. 
127 In this regard, Ayres and Gertner has stated that “[t]he legal rules of 
contracts and corporations can be divided into two distinct classes. The larger 
class consists of ‘default’ rules that parties can contract around by prior 
agreement, while the smaller, but important, class consists of ‘immutable’ rules 
that parties cannot change by contractual agreement. Default rules fill the gaps in 
incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties’ contract around them. 
Immutable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties 
attempt to contract around them.” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 87. In this 
sense, Posner has argued that “the default rules should “economize on transaction 
costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have 
to adopt by express agreement.” POSNER, supra note 4, at 372. Additionally, Ben-
Shahar has stated that “[t]here is a troubling paradox surrounding one of the most 
basic tenets of contract law that gaps in contracts should be filled with terms that 
mimic the will of the parties-terms that most parties would have jointly chosen. 
On the one hand, this conception of gap filling makes basic sense: It minimizes 
the need of the parties to contract around the default rule, and it spells out 
performance provisions that maximize the parties’ joint well-being. But on the 
other hand, the mimic-the-parties'-will principle assumes that the parties’ joint 
will exists. It assumes that there is a single term such that, if only the parties spent 
the time and attention dealing with the gap, they would have jointly supported the 
drafting of this term. Yet the existence of a gap in a contract is often an indication 
that a consensus could not be reached-that a single jointly preferable term does 
not exist. The claim from which the analysis in this paper begins is that there are 
situations in which more than one term satisfies the standard conception of the 
joint will of the parties to a contract. Absent a more powerful prescription, then, 
the will-mimicking principle would be indeterminate and too amorphous to fill 
the gap.” Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 400–01. Finally, Baird and Jackson have 
stated that “the default rules governing the debtor-creditor relationship “should 
provide all the parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if 
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[A]s transaction costs increase, so does the parties’ willingness to accept 
a default that is not exactly what they would have contracted for. Scholars 
who attribute contractual incompleteness to transaction costs are naturally 
drawn toward choosing defaults that the majority of contracting parties 
would have wanted because these majoritarian defaults seem to minimize 
the costs of contracting.128 
 
It would appear that the state should choose a default rule 
reflecting the majority preference. This being the criterion for 
determining the proper default rule, it is essential to ask ourselves 
which dispute settlement mechanism is most desired by the Peruvian 
business community for commercial matters. Only by knowing for 
certain the preferred dispute mechanism can we determine the 
optimal default jurisdiction. 
In Peru, arbitration has become the preferred dispute 
mechanism for commercial disputes. Almost all commercial 
disputes are resolved through arbitration. It should not come as a 
surprise that Peru is one of the countries with the most arbitrations 
per capita in the world. The natural order of things has been 
reversed. In commercial matters, at least, arbitration is the rule, and 
courts, the exception. 
It is curious, to say the least, that arbitration is often 
considered as an alternative mechanism of dispute resolution. At 
least in Peru, arbitration has become, undeniably, the natural 
mechanism for resolving commercial disputes. It is the rule, and, by 
definition, the rule cannot be an alternative. 
The rationality behind the economic theory of default rules 
is precisely to respond to market demand. Then, if it is crystal clear 
that arbitration is the preferred dispute mechanism, it should be 
recognized as the default jurisdiction. This suggests that recognizing 
arbitration as the default jurisdiction would be the confirmation of a 
phenomenon that has been stealthily strengthening for decades. 
Factually, arbitration already works as the default rule. Arbitration 
has already become the natural mode of commercial dispute 
resolution. 
                                                            
they had had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal.” Baird 
& Jackson, supra note 4, at 835–36. 
128 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 93 (emphasis added). 
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Recognizing arbitration as the default jurisdiction will 
definitely promote the evolution of Lex Mercatoria because many 
types of disputes that were previously resolved in the courts will 
now be resolved through arbitration. Consequently, there will be 
more arbitral awards and that will facilitate the evolution of Lex 
Mercatoria in many areas where its development was stagnant. 
 
 
* * * * 
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